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REAGAN NUCLEAR STRATEGY SAID MORE AGGRESSIVE THAN PREDECESSORS'

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[Article by V. V. Zhurkin: "The Strategy of Nuclear Aggression"]

[Text] From the very beginning, the Reagan Administration's nuclear strategy was based on the hope of disrupting the existing military-strategic balance in the world. Furthermore, the dangerous destabilizing features of this strategy grew stronger with each year, and this is clearly reflected in the main presidential documents on matters of military strategy--national security decision directives NSDD-13 (1981), NSDD-32 (1982), NSDD-85 (1983) and NSDD-119 (1984)--and the plans and objectives of the U.S. Defense Department.

Western experts on military affairs frequently argue about the new elements the Reagan Administration added to U.S. nuclear strategy and the areas in which it followed tradition—they argue about the balance of old and new elements. These arguments obscure the main consideration.

The main consideration is the fact that the Reagan Administration's nuclear strategy quite unequivocally combines continuity with innovation. As far as continuity is concerned, this strategy adopted all of the most dangerous and adventuristic features of postwar American doctrines and theories, concentrating them in a single knot. All of the current administration's innovations have the same purpose and are dictated by a single major objective—the achievement of superiority to the USSR and the development of the U.S. ability to "win" a nuclear war.

At first, these aims were openly, and even ostentatiously, announced by administration officials. Later, after realizing that they had frightened the Americans and their allies, they began to speak in the unctuous tones of "peacemakers." However, "in the beginning was the word," and it was absolutely unambiguous.

The 1980 Republican campaign platform, drafted by Reaganists, already contained the frank statement: "We must secure a sufficient increase in military spending for the eventual achievement of military superiority." The reasons why this superiority was necessary were explained repeatedly by President R. Reagan, who stressed that he wanted American nuclear forces to be able to fight a protracted

nuclear war and to win it.² The President's words were echoed by other political leaders in his administration.

As for Pentagon officials, Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger said numerous times that the administration's military preparations had the aim of "victory" in a nuclear war. "Military force should be used," his exact words were, "when this is absolutely necessary. And absolutely necessary means the need to take the upper hand. Or, if we must use this terrible word, the need to win." Secretary of the Navy J. Lehman agreed with his boss: "You must have the potential to win a war if you want victory." In general, these frank statements of the period of initial intoxication with power provide a fairly precise picture of the nuclear plans of Ronald Reagan and his closest advisers.

The declarations of this period were not confined to the verbal framework. All the Reagan Administration's subsequent actions had the aim, on the one hand, of providing a material basis for this goal (direct expenditures of strategic nuclear forces in real terms rose 96 percent between 1980 and 1984 and became the most dynamic element of the American military budget), and on the other, of developing a philosophical rationale for the plans for nuclear aggression. Two series of documents on military policy were compiled in accordance with this: One series stated the aims and basic guidelines of strategy, as well as its political-propaganda trappings, and the other listed the methods of its material support.

Carter's controversial directive, PD-59, was chosen as the spring-board in the first of these areas. All of its dangerous destabilizing elements—the emphasis on "limited" nuclear war, preparations for a first strike to "decapitate" the enemy, preparations for nuclear raids, etc.—were quickly transferred to a corresponding Reagan document—NSDD-13—signed by the President in October 1981. The previous administration's innovations, however, were only a point of departure for the strategic tricks of Reagan and Weinberger. In fact, NSDD-13 and an amplifying directive signed by Reagan in May 1982 (NSDD-32) went much further.

Annual Pentagon objectives for the coming 5 years were expanded considerably to accelerate the transformation of belligerent aims into a tangible government policy, and this was correctly pointed out by American authors: They began to include "thorough and detailed discussions of military policy, including policy in the sphere of strategic arms." When the first such document—a list of objectives for 1984-1988, signed by C. Weinberger on 22 March 1982—was leaked to the press, it understandably aroused a storm of indignation in the United States and the rest of the world, because it contained a cynically frank discussion of plans for total war against the Soviet Union with the use of nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction.

These plans were clarified during the further expansion of the fifth comprehensive operational plan for the use of nuclear weapons and the drafting of a document corresponding to the Reagan Administration's ambitions, "Policy on Nuclear Weapons," which represents a detailed plan for nuclear war. A new version of this document, signed by C. Weinberger in July 1982, includes all of the Reagan Administration's principal innovations.

As for the material preparations for nuclear war, the foundations of the program for the achievement of nuclear superiority to the Soviet Union ("the most all-encompassing and far-reaching effort of the last 20 years," as it was described by the U.S. Congress) were set forth by Ronald Reagan on 2 October 1981. The program was later clarified and expanded considerably in a series of presidential decisions, particularly his directive on national space policy of 4 July 1982 and his decision on space-based and other ABM systems of 23 March 1983, followed by the directive of 25 March on national security decisions (NSDD-85) on ways of "eliminating the threat posed by ballistic missiles." All of this was further clarified in a directive (NSDD-119) signed by Reagan on 6 January 1984 and listing the basic guidelines of ABM system engineering.

One of the distinctive features of current programs is the careful preparation of reserve funds for the future to secure the quantitative and qualitative buildup of U.S. strategic arms up to the end of the 20th century and into the 21st. Stepped-up modernization is being conducted in all links of the former strategic triad (ICBM's, SLBM's and bombers), which, with the development of sea-, land- and air-based cruise missiles and the mass-scale deployment of medium-range missiles, is turning into a pentagonal nuclear structure. The program for the development of ABM systems, closely related to the plans for the militarization of space and often called "star wars" in the United States, is the latest "rage" in Washington. American strategists dream of turning these systems into something just short of the main means of delivering a first strike in the future.

The "star wars" apologists are now concentrating on two areas—the development of antisatellite weapons and the establishment of a massive antisatellite system based partly in space and partly on land. Both of these areas are closely interrelated: The destruction of the other side's satellites, in order to "blind" it, has always been regarded by the United States as a major element of a surprise first strike. The extensive ABM system is supposed to prevent a retaliatory strike by the other side after it has been weakened by an American nuclear attack. Furthermore, the development of antisatellite weapons is regarded as a specific current objective. The plans for the broad—scale ABM system, based on land and, in particular, in space, are a militarist program for the future, extending into the 21st century.

The initial stages of this work have been intensive, and the first sizable allocations have been authorized. The estimated cost of the program in the 1980's is 26 billion dollars, but it could exceed 500 billion by the end of the century. More than 100 platforms, carrying lasers for the destruction of ballistic missiles, are to be launched into space. The Pentagon's construction of a center for the coordination of space operations is already under way east of Colorado Springs. Thousands of people are being transferred there, and firms such as Lockheed, Martin Marietta and Boeing are establishing their own facilities there. The construction of a Pentagon launching site for military "shuttles" is being completed on Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. All of this is only the beginning.

A complete "star wars" control system is being organized in the United States: A space command was added to the U.S. Air Force on 1 September 1982 and to the U.S. Navy in June 1983. On 27 March 1984, Air Force Lt Gen J. Abrahamson, previously the head of the shuttle program, was appointed director of the program for the development of the space-based ABM system. In this way, an infrastructure is quickly being built for the extension of the arms race to outer space.

As for the antisatellite system (ASAT), which is to be tested in 1984, it is the first visible step toward "star wars." This is a new-generation weapon. In contrast to the first such system—the American land-based stationary system, tested on Johnston Atoll in the center of the Pacific Ocean in the mid-1960's and then removed from operation, the new antisatellite weapon is a two-stage missile warhead installed on an all-weather F-15 fighter plane. Therefore, the system is mobile, and this substantially expands the possibilities for its combat use. The Pentagon plans to build 112 antisatellite warheads before 1987. Although official plans envisage their installation on only two F-15 squadrons, any plane of this type can be re-equipped for the ASAT system within 6 hours. Laser weapons and other means of destroying satellites are being developed to supplement this system.

The Washington militarists' heighhened interest in space has not diminished their enthusiasm for traditional strategic arms programs. The main program will perfect all of the properties and features of strategic arms systems to augment their first-strike capability.

Land-based ICBM's are considered to be particularly suitable for this purpose in the United States. After wearing down the resistance of certain groups in the Congress, the White House has stepped up the MX program (according to Reagan's plan, announced on 2 October 1981, the deployment of the first 100 MX missiles has been scheduled for 1986-1990). The MX is a typical first-strike weapon. It is a highly accurate missile with 10 powerful warheads (with the possibility of increasing the number to 12 or more). Its force can range from 300 to 475 kilotons, and it could reach 600 or even 800 kilotons in the future. This is far greater than the force of the latest ICBM's now at the disposal of U.S. strategic forces.

The section of Reagan's program of 2 October 1981 pertaining to ICBM's envisaged the deployment of only MX missiles. Furthermore, at first they were to be deployed in smaller quantities than the previous administration had planned. By the beginning of 1983, however, the program had been fundamentally ammended. Ronald Reagan adopted the recommendations submitted to him on 6 April 1983 by the Commission on Strategic Forces, headed by Lt Gen (Ret) B. Scowcroft, on the development of another type of mobile intercontinental missile, conditionally called the "midgetman." These missiles (smaller than the MX), with one warhead of the same type as those in the MX missiles, are to be deployed in huge quantities (3,350 and even 5,000 are some of the figures mentioned in the United States) from the beginning of the 1990's on.

The decision to deploy the "midgetman" missiles explains the relative ease with which the Reagan Administration consented to reduce the original MX program, adopted by the previous administration, by half (from 200 to 100).

Reaganism's public relations experts described this reduction as something just short of proof of the new administration's balanced approach to strategic programs. But the "midgetman" decision put everything in place: The plan consisted in expanding, and not reducing, ICBM programs by means of diversification. Different varieties of the "midgetman" type of missile had been discussed in the United States for several years, but under different names, such as the Pershing III (with the addition of two new stages to the Pershing II missile and the extension of its range to 13,000 kilometers), the Boeing firm's so-called small missile (300-stage, with a range of over 10,000 kilometers), etc. The Scowcroft commission recommended the deployment of many "small" missiles in addition, and not in place of, the MX missiles. 11 Therefore, we can definitely say that as far as ICBM's are concerned, Reagan's program envisaged a dramatic breaktrhough in the expansion of their first-strike capabilities from the very beginning.

This is precisely the aim of the changes in the program for the expansion of the underwater component of U.S. strategic forces -- the construction of nuclear submarines of the Trident type with C4 and D5 missiles. The traditional submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's) have usually been regarded as "second-strike" weapons in the United States in connection with their insufficient accuracy, their comparatively less powerful nuclear ammunition and their much shorter range in comparison to ICBM's. The Trident system is making a break with this tradition. In terms of accuracy and explosive force, its missiles are comparable to ICBM's, and the Trident II system (B5) will use warheads as powerful as those on the MX missiles (MK-21), with the sole difference that they will be given a new name (MK-5). 12 For the first time in the history of U.S. strategic forces, submarine-launched missiles are comparable to land-based ICBM's in terms of combat capabilities. Furthermore, they are comparable to ICBM's with all of the characteristics of a first-strike weapon. The Trident program was stepped up at the very beginning of the Reagan Administration. A fifth submarine of this type was added to the existing four, six others are now in the shipyards, and the fourth of these (or the ninth of all the ships) will be equipped with Trident II missiles in 1988.

The first-strike capability of U.S. strategic aviation is being developed primarily with a huge quantity (according to various sources, from 3,500 to 5,500) of cruise missiles. More than 60 of the B-52 heavy bombers included in U.S. strategic aviation have already been equipped with these missiles. Cruise missiles will also be installed on the new B-1B bombers, the projected manufacture of which was announced by Ronald Reagan in October 1981, and later on the even more highly perfected strategic bombers which have been named "Stealth" bombers for their ability to escape detection by radar and other means of air defense. The first allocations for the Stealth bomber were authorized by the Reagan Administration in fiscal year 1982.

When American experts discuss cruise missiles, they usually say nothing about the fundamentally new features they added to the system of U.S. strategic forces. They try to describe them merely as some kind of extension of the capabilities of a particular branch of the armed forces or as an addition to the existing properties of these forces. In fact, however, the cruise missiles have become a separate, although diversified in terms of basing methods (air, sea and land), new component of U.S. strategic forces.

With references to the longer duration of the cruise missile's flight to its target in comparison to that of ballistic missiles, American propaganda categorically classifies them as "retaliatory strike weapons," supposedly devoid of the element of surprise. In fact, however, cruise missiles play a significant role in the plans for a first strike for several reasons. First of all, as even official American documents admit, "cruise missiles are difficult to track and, besides this, they can change direction during flight," and this means that the other side "could miscalculate the origin, scales and targets of the attack." Secondly, cruise missiles are exceptionally accurate—within a range of 30 meters. This makes them, in the Pentagon's admission, suitable weapons for the destruction of "hardened targets" (ICBM silos, command and control centers, etc.). Finally, the plans to use cruise missiles in a massive first strike are attested to by the colossal scales of their engineering program—envisaging up to 12,000 missiles (this is approximately equivalent to the present U.S. arsenal of strategic nuclear warheads).

The description of cruise missiles as part of the first-strike system is also corroborated by the plans for their development. These plans include the conversion of cruise missiles into intercontinental weapon systems (by doubling or tripling their range), the augmentation of their present subsonic speed to supersonic speeds (the first advanced strategic air-launched cruise missiles, ASALM, will have a speed of Mach four), and the use of "Stealth" technology to heighten their capacity to break through the other side's defenses.

The deployment of the 464 cruise missiles and 108 Pershing II missiles in Western Europe occupies a special position in American first-strike strategy. These missiles, deployed in Europe and with a range extending into Soviet territory, have a Jouble mission: They could be used as part of a global invasion of the US.R and simultaneously as a major element of "limited nuclear war" in Europe, securing it (after the entire deployment cycle has been completed in 1988) with a large arsenal of highly efficient weapons. Back in 1977 the Pentagon was already calling cruise missiles "ideally suited for a limited nuclear attack." The total number of nuclear munitions at the disposal of the United States and its allies and capable of reaching targets within Soviet territory could be extremely high, considering the fact that they already have more than 3,000 such munitions in Western Europe today.

The Pershing II missiles with their short flight time have been assigned a unique role in the plans for "limited" and total nuclear war--they will be used for the destruction of the particularly important and fortified objects the Pentagon calls "immediate targets": the main administrative centers and the most effective, and therefore, well-protected, elements of strategic forces. It was precisely for this purpose that heightened accuracy--35-40 meters--was added to the short flight time of the Pershing II. A special "penetrating" nuclear warhead, the W-86, which explodes only after it is far underground, has been developed for this missile.

One of the many odd events in Pentagon history took place in connection with this warhead. Two nuclear warheads were being prepared at the same time for the Pershing II: the "penetrating" W-86 and the conventional W-85, and exactly 3 times as much was spent on the development of the former as on the latter in the beginning of the 1980's. 18 Suddenly, however, it was efficially announced that the conventional warhead had been chosen for the Pershing II, and all information about the "penetrating" warhead was simultaneously classified. Since the Pentagon regularly plays games of this kind, it is probable that the story of the Pershing II warheads will be continued (particularly since at least 384 Pershing II missiles will now be sent to Europe instead of the officially projected figure of 108). Meanwhile, Washington is moving ahead in the scheduled deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe, begun at the end of 1983, escalating tension on the European continent.

The change in priorities in the system called "C 3 " in the United States (command, control and communications) has played a unique role in the Reagan Administration's preparations for nuclear aggression. Allocations for this system have approximately doubled in real terms under the Reagan Administration, increasing at almost the same speed as expenditures on strategic nuclear forces. 19

Of course, Washington has always paid close attention to the ${\rm C}^3$ system, just as to intelligence. There has been constant development in both of the main varieties of this system, which have been clearly separated by American researchers: 20 one variety for peacetime, crises and conventional war, and the other designed specifically for nuclear war.

A new feature of Reagan's program is the special emphasis on the systems of C³ and intelligence, which are supposed to survive a "protracted" nuclear war and continue functioning under these conditions. This objective was set back in fall 1981 in NSDD-12 on "strategic communications" and was later amplified in a number of other fundamental documents. In accordance with these decisions, airborne command posts are being enlarged and perfected, particularly the four presidential E-4B Boeing planes, a communication system is being adapted for "limited" and "protracted" nuclear war, satellites capable of quickly estimating the effects of an American nuclear attack are being perfected, etc. All of this is part of the massive efforts to prepare U.S. nuclear forces for a first strike.

The Reagan Administration's nuclear strategy was set forth just as clearly and unambiguously as the plans for its material support. A document on "defense objectives for fiscal years 1984-1988" said that the goal of this strategy consisted in "shattering the entire structure of the military and political strength of the Soviet Union and its allies." A comprehensive general plan for the accumulation and use of nuclear weapons was adopted for the first time under the Reagan Administration. In this plan, the stages of the nuclear arms buildup are related to detailed preparations for a nuclear attack.

A distinctive feature of Reagan's nuclear strategy was and is the absence of any official name for this strategy. Previous strategies were the "massive retaliation" of D. Eisenhower and G. Dulles, the "flexible response" of

J. Kennedy and L. Johnson, the "realistic deterrence and intimidation" of R. Nixon and G. Ford and the "superior (or active) counterforce" of J. Carter and H. Brown. The present strategy is the most aggresive of the postwar doctrines, but it has no official title or label.

The reason for this is the unprecedented atmosphere of lies and hypocrisy cultivated by the current Washington administration and closely related to the continuously reinforced campaign with regard to the "Soviet military threat." This campaign, which broke out sporadically in the United States in the past, became a permanent element of U.S. political propaganda in recent years and has now been elevated to its highest point. Furthermore, this nuclear strategy rests on two particularly shameless lies.

The first is the groundless allegation that the balance of strategic forces has changed in favor of the Soviet Union (this is being alleged at a time when the United States is invariably ahead in terms of the number of strategic warheads). American ruling circles have shamelessly called the nameless strategy aimed at the achievement of nuclear superiority a "balancing mechanism." The essential features of this approach were frankly described by a prominent interpreter of Reagan's strategy, President C. Gray of the National Institute for Policy Studies, who said that Washington should "discuss parity while preparing for victory." And this is exactly what the present Washington strategists are doing.

The other lie on which the administration's nuclear policy is based is just as cynical, if not more so: The best method of "deterrence" is the guaranteed ability to fight and win a nuclear war. In this way, any preparations for nuclear aggression are disguised as defense.

It is significant that the willingness to deliver the first nuclear strike, regardless of how it might be camouflaged, has always been part of American military doctrine. In this respect, the Reagan Administration's nuclear strategy represents a synthesis of the two main doctrines of the time (the 1950's and 1960's) when the United States was superior to the USSR in the nuclear sphere—"massive retaliation" and "flexible response." What is more, it has taken the most dangerous elements of the two doctrines and has also added much that is new—and is reckless and even more dangerous—to this synthesis.

The Reagan-Weinberger strategy is related to "massive retaliation" in its heightened willigness to use nuclear weapons first. The idea of a nuclear attack permeates NSDD-13 and NSDD-32 and the Pentagon's plans for the coming 5 years. Several people have frankly admitted that this is precisely the purpose of the massive rearming of American strategic forces. As Undersecretary of Defense R. Delauer said, the improved accuracy of new American systems "will provide a counterforce capability enabling the destruction of hardened Soviet targets and could even provide the capability for a preemptive strike." Of course, plans for a first or "pre-emptive" strike have always existed in the United States. In connection with this, American researcher R. Betts correctly states: "If the planners of the strategic air command were to take a lie detector test, it would be clear that their only

hope in the event of war is a full-scale pre-emptive strike."24 Under the Reagan Administration this obsession has been elevated to its highest point and has been dressed in the garb of government policy.

The strategy of "massive retaliation" once envisaged the accelerated transfer to the use of nuclear weapons even in local conflicts. Today's Washington strategists are actively preparing for this use of nuclear weapons in various parts of the world—the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and East Asia.

Europe is still the main zone of potential nuclear aggression. Defense Department objectives for fiscal years 1984-1988 directly envisage the possibility of the first use of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. The objectives specifically state: "Plans for the initial and subsequent use of battlefield nuclear forces must be drawn up to give the supreme command flexibility in the use of battlefield nuclear forces in different ways and on different levels." In this way, the deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles has already been directly related to first-strike plans.

On the surface, Reagan's strategy is also similar to another doctrine of the period of American nuclear superiority—"flexible response"—and not only because the word "flexibility" is used so much in all of C. Weinberger's reports. They are similar because the current administration's strategy envisages the broadest range of methods of using military force. But there is also a fundamental difference. The doctrine of "flexible response" envisaged the use of conventional armed forces in a variety of ways with the subsequent use of nuclear weapons in later stages. In the Reagan-Weinberger doctrine, the main sphere of "flexibility" has become the search for the greatest variety of ways of using nuclear weapons. Different versions of "limited" and "local" nuclear wars have been outlined, but the greatest effort has been invested in the development of the concept of "protracted" nuclear wars, the first signs of which were evident under the Carter Administration, especially in PD-59.

"Protracted" nuclear war has become a genuine religious symbol for Washington strategists. The defense objectives for fiscal years 1984-1988 stressed that "U.S. nuclear forces should prevail in a protracted war." Various plans are being worked out for wars of different lengths, designed for a few weeks or months. In August 1982 the Pentagon submitted a detailed plan to the National Security Council for a strategic nuclear war lasting up to 6 months. Methods of fighting a "protracted" nuclear war continued to be clarified after this.

During the process of this clarification, it has been persistently stressed that U.S. nuclear forces and their C³ systems should be given maximum "flexibility and durability" and the ability to quickly assess the damages inflicted by American strikes on the other side, retarget strategic weapons and maneuver them. As Pentagon objectives state, "it will be necessary to hold part of U.S. offensive nuclear forces in reserve, under any circumstances, so that the United States will never be left with no nuclear weapons at the end of a nuclear war." The expectation of a prolonged nuclear conflict has become an important element of American strategic doctrine.

In its persistent preparations for "protracted" nuclear war. Washington has not given up the plans for a "nuclear blitzkrieg" involving a single all-out attack. The clearest proof of this is the Pentagon's obsession with the details of the criminal concept of "decapitation"—a surprise nuclear attack on the other side's administrat_ve and control centers.

In Pentagon objectives, "decapitation" is listed among the major goals of nuclear war. The number of these targets in the comprehensive operational plan is constantly rising. Last year they already accounted for around 10 percent of the total, and by the middle of the 1980's the figure should be around 20 percent. The Pershing II missiles in the FRG, with their short flight time, have been assigned a special role.

The plans for "decapitation" would seem to contradict the popular theories of "limited" or "protracted" nuclear wars because the other side would have no chance of controlling their development. This is essentially an attempt to develop the capability for the greatest variety of nuclear wars and to move quickly from unsuccessful methods to others and broaden the scales of nuclear aggression considerably. The concept of "decapitation" is a convincing reminder that the surprise all-out nuclear attack—global nuclear aggression planned in advance—occupies an important place in Washington's plans.

Further proof is provided by one of the Reagan Administration's major additions to U.S. strategic dectrine—the insistence on the need for antisatellite systems. The question of the significance of antisatellite systems was decided more than a decade ago during heated debates in the United States. It was acknowledged that although antisatellite systems are sometimes called "defensive," they actually represent the most important element of the first-strike strategy: After delivering a strike, the aggressor will use an antisatellite system for protection against the weakened retaliatory strike of the target of aggression.

As military designer R. Aldridge wrote, the opposite of the old axiom "a good offense is the best defense" is true in the nuclear age: "In this case, the opposite is true: A 'good' offensive is secured by strong defenses against ballistic missiles and bombers. If the Pentagon can defend itself well, nothing will keep it from attacking." The deceptive term "defense" conceals a major component of the first-strike system.

Although Reagan's ABM plans, including space— and land-based systems, served as the occasion for a propaganda campaign portraying them as the means of America's salvation, even officials have let admissions of real intention slip. For example, the President himself said in an interview in March 1983 that the combination of offensive strength and "defensive superiority" offered Washington a broad range of possibilities. The systems, which are still described with the traditional adjective "defensive," are always closely connected with offensive systems. A vivid example of this was the last annual report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which singled out two chief priorities in the strategic sphere: the modernization of strategic nuclear forces and preparations for the development of "defensive" weapons. The development of an ABM system

will compound the danger of any variety of nuclear attack, whether it is "limited," "protracted" or all-out nuclear war.

The plans for ABM systems are closely related to U.S. plans for the military use of space, although the Washington aggressors' cosmic ambitions are even more extensive. Sometimes they even discuss the possibility of turning future weapons in outer space into something just short of the chief means of ruling the world (with reliance, which has already proved futile so many times, on American technologial "superiority"). Today the ABM systems are the primary elements of these ambitious plans. For example, Gen D. Graham, one of the ideologists of "star wars," wrote: "When we look to space in the search for a technological victory over the Soviets, we see that all of the factors advise us to emphasize strategic defense."33

Aroused emotions cause others to go much further. "It does not take much imagination," said Under Secretary of the Air Force E. Aldridge, "to see that the country controlling space can control the world." The previously mentioned NSDD-85 and NSDD-119, adopted in 1983 and 1984, set forth specific objectives in the extension of the arms race to outer space and the militarization of space in search of this impossible dream.

The resourceful militarist mentality in the United States is persistently seeking monstrous means of disrupting the strategic balance. Theories are being propounded. The arms race has been escalated to the maximum.

Blinded by fanaticism (and historical ignorance), the present American strategists are afraid of looking back at all of postwar history. But after all, spasmodic attempts to gain an irreversible lead were made in the 1950's, and in the 1960's, and in the 1970's, and they were quite impressive. Within 5 years, between 1949 and 1954, the number of strategic U.S. bombers was quadrupled (from 75 to 300). The beginning of the next decade the number of ICBM's increased 13-fold (from 63 to 834) over 3 years, between 1961 and 1964. The number of warheads doubled over 4 years (1970-1974)—from 4,000 to around 8,000. These spurts of activity, which included radical qualitative advances as well as quantitative changes, were accompanied by the appropriate set of militarist theories.

Each of these ambitious rounds of the race for a "winning position" ultimately ended with the erosion of American imperialism's positions. This was the result of the inexorable force of factors opposing these efforts.

The current spurt of activity by the supporters of nuclear aggression is particularly sweeping, primarily in terms of the resources spent on it and the adventurism of the plans for it. Opposing factors, however, are incomparably stronger in the 1980's than they were in the past. The Soviet Union is fully determined to block any U.S. attempts to disrupt the strategic balance and achieve military superiority.

If the United States could not attain the political or military objectives set by Washington in the 1950's and 1960's, when the United States was superior to to the Soviet Union in the sphere of nuclear weapons, it is all the more senseless to try to disrupt the strategic balance today. "Any aggressor," Comrade K. U. Chernenko stressed, "will have to deal with immediate revenge. Let everyone be aware of this--both our friends and our enemies." 37

The mass movement against the threat of war engendered by Washington's policy is growing stronger. There is serious disorder in the ranks of U.S. allies and fears about the future dangers posed by Washington's irresponsible behavior. The world is different today, and the direction and rhythm of the changes in this world are contrary to the expectations of the engineers of Washington's nuclear strategy.

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AMERICAN LIBERALISM: THE SEARCH FOR NEW ALTERNATIVES

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[Article by E. Ya. Batalov and B. V. Mikhaylov]

[Text] Many American researchers (and not only Americans) of the late 1970's and early 1980's reported a rightward shift in U.S. politics. This kind of shift did take place, although it was limited in scope and depth. It is now becoming increasingly obvious, however, that it constituted only a part of a more fundamental, and apparently quite lengthy and contradictory, process. This is a process of the reorganization of the entire spectrum of political affiliations and the corresponding types of public political opinion which took shape in the United States during the 1960's and 1970's.

"Although the interpretation of contemporary history is a risky matter," the preface to an anthology recently published in the United States, "Rethinking Liberalism," says, "it appears that there is reason to say that the decade of the 1980's is a period of transition in American politics in the full sense of the term, comparable on the most general level to the 1930's, which ushered in the 'Roosevelt revolution' that laid the foundation of the American 'welfare state.'" According to the authors, however, this transition will not be a mere repetition of the 1930's, "a repetition in which the 'Reagan revolution' will make 'supply-side economics' a built-in feature of federal policy and will establish a long-term Republican majority. The present decade will most probably enter history as a more complex period, providing no clear evidence of the victory of the Left or the Right as we know them, but simultaneously marking the end of the old liberalism and its postulate that social justice and economic opportunity can be secured by means of large-scale federal programs."²

Describing the 1980's as a transition period in U.S. political history, the authors of this anthology understandably concentrate on the prospects of American liberalism. It has had a significant effect on the American political climate since the time of F. Roosevelt's "New Deal." In recent years, however, liberalism has undergone serious difficulties of an ideological and organizational nature. Evidence of this can be seen in the heavy losses suffered by the Democratic Party, the political stronghold of liberal forces in the United States, in the 1980 elections, and the extensive discussions of the present state of liberalism in the American press.

Today there are several signs of new trends in American liberalism. They reflect the mood of the particular segment of the ruling class and its constituents who reject "Reaganism" as an unreliable basis for the performance of the new tasks facing America in the sphere of economics, social relations and domestic and foreign policy, but who also believe that traditional liberal methods do not meet the requirements of these tasks either. This is the reason for the attempts to find a practical alternative to "Reaganism," which would lead, without any departure from liberal principles, to the planning of a new domestic and foreign policy line capable of serving as the Democratic Party's program of action for the 1980's.

Of course, the American variety of liberalism does not represent all American political traditions, but it will determine the chief guidelines of the reorganization of the entire spectrum of political outlooks and corresponding types of public political opinion. This is why the examination of new developments and trends in American liberalism at the start of the 1980's is not only of interest in itself, but can also provide the key to the evolution of political awareness, including public political opinion, in the American society.

The Outlines of Postwar Liberalism

With a view to its social-class nature, American liberalism can be defined as the ideology and policy of bourgeois reformism, aimed at the stabilization and improvement of the capitalist system and the alleviation of its inherent contradictions by means of economic and social maneuvers.

Of course, the description of American liberalism as a variety of bourgeois reformism does not mean that the liberals are incapable of taking the interests of broader segments of the American society into account to some degree and in certain respects in their approach to economic, social and political problems. According to liberals, the stability of this system can only be maintained if contradictions within it are resolved or at least alleviated and the appropriate measures are taken to secure the well-being-obviously, to varying degrees--of all of the classes and groups making up the society ("the nation as a whole," as the liberals themselves say). This fundamental aim has colored the ideological outlook and political strategy of liberalism in the postwar years. This strategy mainly emphasized the following: 1) the maintenance of steady and fairly high rates of American economic growth; 2) the consolidation of U.S. economic influence in the world; 3) the institution of social reforms within the country. These strategic aims supplemented one another and were essentially elements of a single liberal domestic and foreign policy strategy of the 1950's and 1960's, meeting the requirements of liberalism's social-class functions.

The key element of this strategy was the emphasis on economic growth. Keynesian methods of stimulating this growth were of exceptional political importance, and not just purely economic value, to the liberals. "The basic premise of this strategy, although it is not always openly acknowledged," American researcher B. Kleinberg wrote, "is the belief that the relaxation of tension in relations between different classes does not require the fundamental

redistribution of the social product, but only its continuous growth. The growth of the national product is regarded as a self-contained blessing. According to this belief, when the needs of social groups to improve their financial status are satisfied, they lose interest in ideology, and even in politics as such."⁴

This strategy was based on the popular liberal conviction of the 1960's that the relatively stable growth of the economies of the developed Western countries in the first postwar decades represented a long-term historical factor marking the beginning of a lengthy period of capitalist "prosperity," and that America would invariably surpass all other countries in terms of economic development within the overall context of material progress. This belief seemed valid because successive administrations had been able to sustain more or less stable rates of economic growth and control levels of unemployment and inflation for several years by using Keynesian methods of regulation. It appeared that the attempts of moderate liberals to stabilize the capitalist order by means of its partial "modernization" and the limitation of spontaneous market forces, and the intentions of more radical supporters of reforms to make active use of government regulations for the purpose of quicker advancement toward the "welfare society" would ultimately be successful. As is often the case, however, the actual development of society turned out to be more complex and contradictory than people had anticipated 15 or 20 years before.

The Crisis of Liberalism in the Late 1970's and Early 1980's

As signs of crisis grew stronger in the American economy in the 1970's and U.S. influence in world markets began to decline perceptibly, the continuation of the liberal-reformist line in its previous form became impossible. slower rate of economic growth and the declining effectiveness of production in a number of key industries, largely due to defects in the existing system of state-monopoly regulation, not only limited opportunities for sociopolitical maneuvering but also gave rise to new contradictions and paved the way for new conflicts. As a result, as the American socialist magazine DISSENT noted, "the spectrum of the political struggle in the United States has suddenly shifted, and present-day American liberalism, which has associated the resolution of economic and social problems with the partial but gradually increasing intervention of the federal government ever since the days of the New Deal, has become the target of severe criticism, particularly from the rapidly growing New Right."5 This was, as an analysis of the political-ideological situation in the United States at the turn of the decade indicates, the most severe crisis liberalism had experienced in all of its postwar history.

It was also reflected to some degree in the declining growth rate of labor productivity, the rise in the levels of unemployment and inflation, the corruption of labor ethics and other specific developments of this type. But the fullest and most integral symptom of the crisis was the malfunctioning of the existing system of state-monopoly regulation. Serious flaws in the system, which had been present ever since the days of the New Deal, became graphic corroboration of the obsolescence and exhaustion of the main postulates constituting liberal strategy in the 1950's and 1960's, and to some degree in the 1970's as well.

It is significant that this crisis was not only the result of the overestimation of the American government's capabilities as an instrument of reformist policy. It was also a result of the underestimation of the role of the stronger global connections and global contradictions of capitalism in the approach to the resolution of national (in this case, American) problems—a development called the "crisis of the national government" by some researchers. Capitalism's uneven development, the stronger influence of the socialist world, the stronger tendency toward the internationalization of social life, stimulated by the technological revolution, and the prominence of global problems all led to changes in the geopolitical position of the United States and also dictated the need to examine America's national problems within the international context. But this approach was not part of postwar American liberalism, and it could not respond quickly enough to the changing conditions of its own "reorganization."

Just as in similar cases in the past, the immediate reaction to the new situation was an increase in conservative feelings in the United States. All of the ideas and aims which made their appearance in the late 1970's and early 1980's and were given the name "neoconservatism" provided graphic proof of this. We should remember, however, that "neoconservatism" is a complex politico-ideological current. The obviously reactionary nature of the attempts of "neoconservatives" to reverse the movement of American society, accomplish—the partial dismantling of state-monopoly capitalism and extol the traditions of "free enterprise" should not obscure the fact that these attempts reflected some of the objective requirements of American capitalist development under new conditions: the need to heighten the effectiveness of the overgrown system of government regulation, the revision of some costly government programs, the more effective use of the market machinery of resource distribution, etc.

These and other issues raised by the "neoconservatives" left a substantial mark on the evolution of liberal sociopolitical thought as well. Although the leaders of the liberal wing of the Democratic Party rejected the economic recipes of the "neoconservatives," they also warned the Democrats against a return to the familiar policy of the 1960's and early 1970's. "A National Agenda for the Eighties," a report summarizing the findings of a special commission created to map out Democratic Party policy principles and political strategy for the 1980's, said that the American economy had entered a "transition period -- a period of adapting its structure to changes in the world economy, to the world prices of energy and other resources, to the changing conditions of access to these resources and, finally, to the new values we now associate with non-economic aspects of the 'quality of life' and the protection of the environment." The report went on to say that since rates of economic growth under these conditions could hardly be "as impressive as in the past, it would be much more difficult to secure funds for social needs in coming years, particularly in view of the fact that expenditures on competing items in the federal budget, such as national defense, will remain at the present level." 8

It is indicative that the authors of the report refrained from putting forth any new initiative in the sphere of social policy and even let the Americans

know that their expectations regarding the improvement of their financial status in the next few years would have to be more moderate and "realistic."

Although the Democrats continue to assert that "equality" and "justice" would remain among the important strategic goals of the party in the 1980's, they also stress that the emphasis would have to be shifted from social problems—which was characteristic of the architects of the "Great Society"—to economic problems; in other words, a return from "social liberalism" to "economic liberalism." As the report quoted above said, "only steady economic growth in real terms will allow the United States to attain its goals within the country and in the international arena—from a general rise in the standard of living to the larger revenues earmarked for social needs; from the creation of new jobs to the reinforcement of America's competitive position in the world market and its leading role in the world community."

But how could the economy be adapted to these new conditions? How could American economic growth be secured? How could the liberals take the political initiative away from the conservatives and regain the influence they had lost in the 1970's?

It is understandable that in a current as complex and heterogeneous as American liberalism, the search for answers to these questions is taking various directions. The birth of so-called "neoliberalism"—a modified version of the technocratic liberalism of the 1960's—warrants special attention in this connection because it has recently been promoted with increasing enthusiasm as the main politico—ideological alternative to "Reaganism" within ruling circles.

In the American press the term "neoliberalism" is used today to describe the politico-ideological outlook of young Democratic Senators G. Hart, P. Tsongas, B. Bradley and M. Baucus, Congressmen J. Florio, R. Gephardt, P. Sharp and others, and several state governors and city mayors. The most frequently mentioned theorists of "neoliberalism" include renowned economists such as MIT Professor L. Thurow and Harvard University Professor R. Reich, as well as influential New York politician and financier F. Rohatin. The following books are considered to express the "neoliberal" creed—as far as it has progressed to date: "The Zero-Sum Society" by L. Thurow, "The Next American Frontier" by R. Reich, "The Road From Here" by P. Tsongas and "A New Democracy" by G. Hart. The coordinating center of "neoliberalism" is the Center for National Policy in Washington. 11

The position of the "neoliberals" on some key aspects of domestic and foreign policy has been officially endorsed by the Democratic Party leadership and was taken into account in drafts of the Democratic platform for the 1984 campaign—"Restoring the Road to Opportunity" (1982) and "Renewing America's Promise" (1984). 12 The views of the "neoliberals" also coincided with many statements by the leading contenders for the Democratic presidential nomination.

The "Neoliberal" Alternative

At first, the ideas of the "neoliberals" appeared to be a disconnected group of concepts borrowed from conservatives or even radicals--particularly now

that G. Hart and some of his colleagues have frankly acknowledged their desire to rise above the "Left" and "Right" and to reconcile opposing ideological aims and outlooks. The birth of "neoliberalism" actually testifies to the shifting boundaries between various sections of the spectrum of political affiliations and types of political thinking, to a new, non-traditional approach to the analysis of social and political events and processes and to attempts to revive the liberal creed.

Within the "neoliberal" framework, this revision is being conducted simultaneously in several areas.

In contemporary American politics, one of the most important parameters defining the position of a particular political outlook (or type of consciousness) in the overall spectrum of political outlooks (or types of consciousness) is the attitude toward the government and the market as mechanisms for the regulation of socioeconomic processes. This attitude has served precisely as the main line separating liberalism from conservatism for more than 50 years.

Obviously, both liberals and conservatives must acknowledge the regulative functions of the government and the market, but the degree of this recognition and, consequently, the priority assigned to one or the other of these mechanisms (with all of the ensuing economic, social, political and other consequences) have differed. The conservatives have emphasized the use of the "self-regulating" machinery of the free market, and the liberals have relied primarily on the bourgeois government. Furthermore, as all of postwar history testifies, the more complex the problems the society faced, the more liberals relied on active government intervention in economic and social processes.

"Neoliberalism" has displayed a new approach to the role and functions of the government and market. As "A National Agenda for the Eighties" stressed, "the question of whether the government should or should not play its role in the resolution of our problems does not need any special discussion today because the answer is absolutely obvious: Yes, it should. What does need discussion is government's specific role in various spheres of activity..., there are numerous problems whose successful resolution demands government intervention." Of course, the "neoliberals" stress, the expediency of government intervention in a particular sphere of social and economic life must be determined without emotion and without rhetoric, and a decision must be made in each specific case on "the precise means (subsidies, nationalization, etc.) and methods of this intervention (directive, the establishment of specific standards or greater reliance on economic incentives)." 14

The "neoliberals" believe that contemporary approaches to economic and social problems are no longer a matter of choosing between the market and the government. "In the developed industrial countries, including the United States," R. Reich remarked, "the practice of drawing rigid distinctions between the government and the market ceased to be useful long ago. The government creates the market by determining the conditions and limits of commercial activity on the basis of societal standards and beliefs about the government's responsibility for the healthy functioning of the economy." The "neoliberals," in particular, advocate the replacement of ineffective forms of government control

and regulation of commercial activity and the broader use of the free pricing system with the appropriate tax benefits and other incentives.

It is significant that this outlook is not a departure from liberal tradition in principle, because the latter never denied the significance of the market as such but merely assigned government the deciding role in the regulation of socioeconomic processes. Although the "neoliberals" reject outdated and discredited forms and methods of government regulation and advise the more flexible use of market mechanisms, they also realize that it would be impossible to rely completely on the market today: The reaction of the free pricing system does not always meet the rapidly changing conditions of the optimal distribution of resources, encourage their conservation or support a promising field of technical progress. In these cases, government intervention in the form of regulation or in the form of a specific policy is necessary.

According to the "neoliberals," the renewal of the process of economic growth in the United States will require structural changes in the American economy, the adaptation of old sectors to changing conditions and the establishment of new ones to meet the requirements of mounting competition in the world market. The "neoliberals" plans for the revival of American industry envisage American leadership in the economic and technical spheres and a search for new growth potential within the country. In contrast to the supporters of Reagan's program for the "reindustrialization" of America, who believe that American industry should be reorganized by the private sector, for which purpose the latter should be offered fiscal and other privileges and be relieved of "excessive" government regulation, the "neoliberals" believe that government should play a more important role in this reorganization. The alternative plans discussed by the Democratic Party for the revival of the American economy envisage the much more active use of government regulations than in the past for the setting of economic priorities, the planning of capital investments and the support of domestic industry for the purpose of heightening its competitive potential in world markets.

In connection with this, the "neoliberal" statement in support of a "national industrial policy" is quite indicative. In today's America, the term "industrial policy" signifies a combination of economic ideas and political recommendations for the comprehensive planning of American economic recovery and the reinforcement of U.S. economic positions in world markets. 16

The "neoliberals" have pointed out the fact that almost every industrially developed Western country has a national industrial policy, including programs for the government assistance of corporations, the encouragement of promising sectors, etc. This policy is based on the premise that individual companies are not always capable of adapting to changing conditions in the world economy on their own. According to the supporters of "industrial policy," America's weaker economic position in the world is largely due to the absence of this kind of comprehensive plan for the development of domestic industry. This is why there is an urgent need for new definitions of government's role in this area and for a new relationship between the federal government and the private sector. In the United States, they suggest, the basis of this relationship could consist in consultative bodies responsible for making a national

industrial policy in the interests of individual companies and sectors and the interests of the national economy as a whole.

This, according to the supporters of "industrial policy." will also require institutional reforms, which must give the federal government more extensive powers in economic management. This is precisely the tone of F. Rohatin's proposals, widely supported by "neoliberals," about the creation of a financial reconstruction corporation for the subsidization of depressed sectors and the regulation of capital investments for the purpose of channeling them into regions experiencing economic decline. L. Thurow proposed the creation of a national investment bank—a special government body authorized to offer loans and credit to individual enterprises, particularly in advanced industrial sectors. Similar proposals were made in the previously mentioned document "Restoring the Road to Opportunity" on the creation of a congressional committee to regulate capital investments for the purpose of "effective political control of the investment process."

In a discussion of the essential features of these plans, renowned sociologist A. Etzioni remarked: "In contrast to conservatives, who blame the depressed state of the American economy on its excessive politicization, reflected in the high percentage of the GNP controlled and redistributed by the government and in the excessive regulation of decisions made by the private sector..., they (the supporters of Rohatin and Thurow--author) believe that government should play a greater role. Their diagnosis is that, in comparison to other countries whose economies have developed successfully in recent years (such as, for example, West Germany and Japan), in the United States government institutions cannot ensure the necessary management of the private enterprise economy and its support." 17

As mentioned above, the supporters of "industrial policy" advocate the creation of a consultative body on matters of economic development, with its members representing big business, big unions and government. They feel that the accelerated modernization of American industry will be impossible unless labor unions are involved in the cooperation between government and business men. This trilateral partnership should, in their opinion, secure the more complete integration of labor unions into the system, which will allow for the flexible combination of effective government control with the ability to attain public consent and the voluntary willingness of labor unions "to make sacrifices."

The "neoliberals'" interest in the idea of "tripartism" is a relatively new phenomenon for America. In contrast to the European countries, where various forms of socioeconomic partnerships already exist, this system is virtually absent in the United States. 18

The neoliberal partnership plans envisage broader participation by labor unions in decisionmaking on the government level and on the corporate level. The "neoliberals" regard this participation as an important way of heightening labor productivity and of solving the problem of worker alienation from the labor process. With references to the experience of European labor unions, which are being involved to a greater extent in the decisionmaking process

within firms in the interests of businessmen, the "neoliberals" support the participation programs with which American corporations and unions have recently been experimenting more widely.

The "neoliberal" idea of "corporate regionalism" is closely related to the idea of "tripartism." This implies the kind of interaction by the federal government, state governments, local governments and the private sector that leads to the efficient distribution of functions and duties among all of these parties and the "reconciliation" of tendencies toward centralization and decentralization. It is significant, however, that not all forms of decentralization are supported by the "neoliberals." Many of them regard Reagan's "new federalism" as a potential catastrophe, threatening the growth of local chauvinism and impeding the national cohesion the "neoliberals" want.

The "neoliberals" associate the resolution of these problems (or the "attainment of liberal goals") with an emphasis on pragmatism and a refusal to put idealogical considerations above specific practical aims ("I am interested," P. Tsongas wrote in his book, "in what works, and not in what should work.... Reality is not governed by political theory"). 19 This essentially positivist approach does not, of course, exclude the possibility of the use of various idealogical screens in "neoliberal" policy, but it might attest to a new trend toward "deideologization" in the liberalism of the early 1980's.

The "neoliberals" main objectives in the sphere of foreign and military policy are the following: effective, but less costly and more efficiently organized defense, presupposing the renunciation of ultra-modern weapons (because the expense is not justified); less economic dependence on the outside world (particularly in the sphere of raw materials); "restraint" in U.S. relations with other countries instead of "intervention, military actions and covert operations."

It is significant that in the sphere of foreign policy, liberalism—regardless of the form it takes—is essentially the same as in the sphere of domestic policy, namely bourgeois reformism. The only difference is that liberal strategy in domestic policy is colored by the desire to secure social stability and economic growth by means of reforms and thereby prevent the revolutionary transformation of American seciety, whereas in foreign policy this strategy is based on the desire to rebuild the world and modify and consolidate the system of international relations in such a way as to prevent the revolutionary transformation of the world. It is the aim of liberal foreign policy, S. Hoffmar and C. Vance noted, "to achieve the stability of the international system...by means of orderly change...in the hope that evolutionary processes (or "peaceful changes") will prevail over revolutionary ones in the domestic affairs of other countries." In other words, liberalism in foreign policy is global preventive reformism.

The "neoliberals" view the world not as an arena of "geopolitical confrontation" by the two "superpowers," but as a complex system, global in scale and in the composition of the subjects determining the outcome of world events. This is why they criticize both Reagan's policy of "forcible globalism," based on a "bipolar" view of the world, and the "imperious thinking" of some process within the Democratic Party.

Another important "neoliberal" premise is the realization that the United States lost its previous influence in many spheres of international life in the 1970' --primarily in the strategic (the establishment of the Soviet-U.S. balance) nd economic spheres. It is indicative that the "neoliberals" do not associate this relatively weaker American position in the world with "communist intrigues" or a "communist conspiracy" (as rightists and conservatives do), but with the effects of an entire group of objective causes and factors, including those connected with the globalization of the economic, political, social and cultural life of contemporary societies and their increasing interdependence.

This realization, however, is not contrary to the "neoliberal" beliefs in the exceptional vitality of the "American system" and its ability to adapt and develop, which will allow, in their opinion, it to prevail over other social systems and take a leading role in the world. The important thing, they feel, is not to accept defeat and not to act in accordance with views corresponding to the "foreign policy consensus" of the "cold war" era, but to seek new means and methods, new forms and new spheres of exercising America's leading role within the framework of the werld community.

This, according to these "neoliberals," will necessitate the following. First of all, "America should rely on democratic principles, and not on military strength" (G. Hart) to restore its moral authority in the world. The "neoliberals" have shown sufficient restraint, however, in assessing the possibility of securing global U.S. influence on world processes only on the strength of moral examples. They are distinguished by a more pragmatic approach to the use of moral and ideological factors in addition to factors of economic, political and diplomatic pressure, and even military force in some cases. This is why the "neoliberals" believe that the first objective -- in order of importance -- is the eradication of the crisis of the American economic model and the restoration of U.S. leadership in the economic, scientific and technical spheres, where they believe the United States has been challenged, especially by Japan and the FRG. Another American objective is the "incorporation" of the institutions and mechanisms of interdependence and the more active use of American scientific, technical and technological superiority as a powerful factor of influence in today's world.

The "Hart Phenomenon" and the Prospects of American Liberalism

The foreign policy programs recently proposed by "neoliberals," particularly Gary Hart, emphasize precisely these objectives. And although some observers have noted that many of the ideas he and his associates have expressed are borrowed from the arsenal of traditional Democratic Party foreign policy concepts, the ideas nevertheless display a close relationship to the objectives listed above. When Hart addressed the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations on 16 March 1984, he listed three principles on which, in his opinion, U.S. foreign policy should be based: "These are mutuality, reliability and restraint—more specifically, mutuality in our relations with the Soviet Union, reliability in our relations with our friends and allies and restraint in our relations with the Third World."

This "mutuality" is interpreted as the coexistence of one "superpower" with the other, with the two sides settling their differences "by means other than armed battles" and not striving to win the nuclear arms race or a nuclear war. "Reliability" is interpreted as the maintenance of close relations and regular consultations with allies, but with no U.S. obligation to accede to "all wishes and complaints" or support "all tastes and all claims." Finally, "restraint" would presuppose the sober appraisal of the situation in the Third World, particularly a realization of the fact that "not every Third World problem is an American problem with an American solution" and that "not every revolution in the Third World is a sign of the struggle between East and West."

The "neoliberal" foreign policy outlook is sometimes described as isolationist. The basis for this description is usually the remarks of the same G. Hart, who has repeatedly said that his foreign policy thinking has been influenced greatly by the lessons of Vietnam and that America should take them into account today. However, neither these statements, nor the abovementioned interpretations of "reliability," and "restraint," nor the "neoliberal" desire to reduce economic dependence on other countries can serve as enough evidence of an isolationist outlook.

The reduction of direct U.S. military and political involvement in various parts of the world, on which the "neoliberals" are insisting, will certainly not mean that America will give up its attempts to influence—and sometimes by means of force—the course of world events. However, just as they oppose costly ultra-modern weapon projects not because they want to weaken U.S. military strength, but because they want to make the American military machine more efficient, less costly and more effective, they also want to find efficient, effective and, if possible, less costly forms and methods of U.S. participation in world affairs in the "national interest." Therefore, the foreign policy line proposed by the "neoliberals" would not be a renunciation of interventionism in general, but a renunciation of its outdated and discredited forms. They are motivated by the foreign policy failures of the Carter and Reagan administrations and by a more realistic view of things, demanding consideration for the changing balance of power in the world.

Until recently, people in America spoke of the "neoliberals" as a small group of ideologists and politicians whose views warranted consideration but were not widely known or widely supported. The successes of their most prominent representative, Gary Hart, in this year's campaign led to talk about the "Hart phenomenon" or the "Hart enigma."

Whatever Hart himself might accomplish in the future, however, it is fairly certain that this "phenomenon" confirmed the fact that the need for new ideas and decisions conforming to liberal tradition is being felt more keenly in the country. This is essentially what Hart had in mind. "In our country," he said, "there has long been a desire to break out of the rigid framework of established political tradition.... It seems to me that there is the deepest desire for someone to express this latent idealism, this thirst for national unity and a common cause."

In general, the very fact of "neoliberalism's" appearance corroborates the earlier supposition that the evolution of American political thinking "will probably represent not the linear growth of stateist tendencies and the automatic lessening of market tendencies, but the continuation of the struggle between them, in which reversals and regression are possible and which could engender new, unexpected and unfamiliar constellations of political consciousness, going against existing systems of classification and requiring the construction of new models." Of course, it is still too early to speak of "neoliberalism" as a fully developed current. It is certainly too early to speak of it as a fully developed type of public political thinking. It is in the formative stage, and it will probably be some time before it acquires its more or less final form and is widely accepted in the social strata whose objective interests it expresses.

It is alreacy fairly evident, however, that American liberalism is gradually surmounting its ideological crisis, that this could be the prelude to the eradication of its political crisis and that it could strengthen Democratic Party positions. This is being promoted by the widespread public dissatisfaction with the current administration's efforts to continuously escalate the arms race, settle foreign policy issues by force and continue increasing defense spending by making cuts in allocations for social needs, and by the intensification of the contradictions of "Reaganomics."

FOOTNOTES

- 1. "Rethinking Liberalism," edited by W. Anderson, New York, 1983, p 1.
- 2. Ibid.
- 3. A detailed description of these outlooks and types can be found in the book "Sovremennoye politicheskoye soznaniye v SShA" [Contemporary Political Awareness in the United States], Moscow, 1980.
- 4. B. Kleinberg, "American Society in the Postindustrial Age: Technocracy, Power and the End of Ideology," Columbus (Ohio), 1973, p 37.
- 5. T. Skocpol, "Legacies of New Deal Liberalism," DISSENT, Winter 1983, p 34.
- 6. A. Yu. Mel'vil', "Sotsial'naya filosofiya sovremennogo amerikanskogo conservatizma" [The Social Philosophy of Present-Day American Conservatism], Moscow, 1980; "SShA: konservativnaya volna" [The United States: The Conservative Wave], ed. by A. Yu. Mel'vil', Moscow, 1984.
- 7. "A National Agenda for the Eighties. Report of the Presidential Commission for a National Agenda for the Eighties," Wash., 1980, p 5.
- 8. Ibid., p 2.
- 9. Ibid., p 28.

- 10. L. Thurow, "The Zero-Sum Society: Distribution and the Possibilities for Economic Change," N.Y., 1983; R. Reich, "The Next American Frontier," N.Y., 1983; P. Tsongas, "The Road from Here. Liberalism and Realities in the 1980's," N.Y., 1982; G. Hart, "A New Democracy. A Democratic Vision for the 1980's," N.Y., 1983.
- 11. Although the center is an officially independent organization, it actually unites the leaders of the Democratic Party liberal wing. The occasional publication "Alternatives for the 1980's. Report of Study Group" is issued under its auspices. By summer 1984, 14 issues had been published.
- 12. "Renewing America's Promise. A Democratic Blueprint for Our National Future," The National House Democratic Caucus, Wash., 1984.
- 13. "A National Agenda for the Eighties," p 9.
- 14. Ibid., p 106.
- 15. R. Reich, Op. cit., p 5.
- 16. See, for example, "Restoring American Competitiveness: Proposals for an Industrial Policy. Report of Study Group. Center for National Policy," Wash., January 1984; L. Thurow, "The Case for Industrial Policies," Center for National Policy, Wash., January 1984.
- 17. A. Etzioni, "Re-Industrialize, Revitalize, or What?" NATIONAL JOURNAL, 25 October 1980, pp 1818-1819. Any description of all the different "neoliberal" approaches to "national industrial policy" should include mention of the fact that some of its supporters advocate broader government intervention only in the particular industries that can compete successfully in world markets and can be the "locomotives" of economic growth (computers, electronics, etc.). Others feel that the government should support depressed industries. Still others propose a comprehensive plan for the development of the U.S. economy as a whole, including various industries and not confined only to rapidly developing or declining ones.
- 18. The "neoliberals" believe that the first step toward the creation of this kind of system should be the establishment of an advisory council on economic cooperation (as part of the U.S. Congress or as an independent government agency), which should provide employers and unions, as well as other interested parties, with a forum for the reconciliation of their views on such matters as economic priorities, wages, unemployment, inflation, capital investment policy, etc. The functions of this council would also include the analysis and adjustment of all federal programs.
- 19. P. Tsongas, Op. cit., p XIII.
- 20. "Building the Peace: U.S. Foreign Policy for the Next Decade," by S. Hoffman and C. Vance, Wash., 1982, p 12.
- 21. "Sovremennoye politicheskoye soznaniye v SShA," pp 63-64.

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DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 84 (signed to press 22 Aug 84) pp 50-54

[Article by N. D. Turkatenko]

[Text] Several of the problems disturbing Americans were discussed at the Democratic Party convention of 16-19 July in San Francisco. The preparations for the convention and the convention itself—although it did take place in the traditional circus atmosphere of all such events—bore the imprint of the country's general state of difficulty.

In addition to the wave of chauvinism and militarism which swept the Reagan Administration into office in 1980, another wave has been gathering strength in the country, a wave of fear and worries about the future, about the future of whole segments of the population without "a place in the sun" and about the future of the entire country, which the Reagan Administration has driven to the verge of nuclear conflict and, consequently, to the verge of suicide. With a view to the growth of this wave, Democratic Party leaders and the extremely influential forces behind the party are basing the campaign for the election of the president and many congressmen on the slogan: "Let us advance into the future by making the changes that cannot be put off any longer."

But exactly what kind of changes are these? This is still largely indefinite. All that is definite is that the Democrats realize the scales of the mounting wave of anxiety and dissatisfaction in the country and would like to ride this wave to victory and regain the power they lost in the 1980 elections.

By the time of the convention, the Democrats appeared to be plagued by incurable vacillation and insurmountable disagreements. The three main contenders for the Democratic presidential nomination—Carter Administration Vice—President W. Mondale. Senator G. Hart and prominent black leader from Chicago J. Jackson—fought a genuinely fierce battle during the primaries in various states for electoral votes and for the support of future convention delegates. They frequently took widely diverging positions during this campaign. It is important to underscore another fact: Paradoxically enough, the results of this battle, which went on for several months and appeared to be a fight to the death rather than a fight for life, came as a surprise to many people. To many, but not to all. It is not likely that they surprised the people behind the scenes who

directed the general course of the campaign during the primaries, "orchestrated" the coverage of the campaign by the mass media and oversaw the distribution and use of the large sums without which no contender would have been able to take a single step.

The main result was that the race between such widely divergent contenders as W. Mondale, G. Hart and J. Jackson stirred up the passive voters—that is, those who usually prefer to avoid polling places because they became convinced long ago that their vote cannot have any effect on their personal future or the future of the country.

The fact that Jesse Jackson was in the race gave millions of additional black voters, who represent around 8 percent of the American voting public, an interest in politics. Jackson, an experienced speaker, skillfully used their desire for some kind of significant change in the life of humiliation and insults that is still natural for blacks and other "colored people" in America. In his campaign, Jackson sometimes resorted to extremely radical, by American standards, slogans and methods. The black population was particularly impressed when he went to Syria and brought back a black American pilot who had been taken prisoner at the time of the disgraceful failure of the American venture in Lebanon.

After nominating W. Mondale as their presidential candidate, the Democrats took a bold step and nominated a woman as vice-presidential candidate for the first time in U.S. history. She is Geraldine Ferraro, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives from Queens, New York, and an Italian Catholic. She has already been fitted for an "American Dream" halo: She came from a poor immigrant family and "accomplished everything on her own"--an education, a successful career in law and politics, financial security.... By nominating Ferraro, the Democrats secured the support of the overwhelming majority of women voters. They simultaneously directed attention to the Reagan Administration's poor "service record" in matters of concern to women, especially its refusal to support legislation giving women equal rights with men, as a result of which the legislation was buried.

The convention was the scene of a fierce struggle and of conflicts between various groups. Members of the "Rainbow Coalition," headed by J. Jackson, expressed vehement dissatisfaction when the specific desires of the colored U.S. population were not reflected in the party platform and when no members of the black minority were appointed to Democratic Party and campaign administrative bodies.

The Mondale "team" had to agree to some compromises in the party platform. In general, however, it still resembles the program drafted by a special commission prior to the convention. The commission was made up of influential members of the Congress and the Democratic Party, businessmen, representatives of the academic community and members of the AFL-CIO.

What does the program promise America? It promises much, but mainly in the most general terms. "America must now make a choice which will decide our future," the program says, "and this is a choice between the determination to

solve our problems and the attempt to pretend they do not exist; between the spirit of community and the corroding effects of egotism; between justice for all and privileges for the chosen few; between social welfare and social Darwinism; between broader opportunities and narrower horizons; between diplomacy and conflicts; between arms control and the arms race; between leadership and the search for excuses. America is at a crossroads."

In the sphere of domestic policy, the Democrats have promised to put the economy in order, assigning priority to the rapid reduction of the federal budget deficit, which is now approaching 200 billion dollars and is still growing as a result of administration expenditures exceeding budget revenues. This is known to be largely due to excessive military expenditures, which are projected at 300 billion dollars in fiscal year 1985. Economists have warned that if this trend should continue, payments on the national debt, including interest, will soon exceed all federal budget revenues and the treasury will simply go bankrupt. The authors of the program do not advocate any cardinal reduction of military expenditures, but they do point out the need to bring them in line with economic capabilities.

The program contains important statements about Democratic policy on arms and on many foreign policy issues.

Here are some of their aims:

To update the SALT II treaty and resubmit it to the Senate for discussion and agreement;

To conduct major stabilizing reductions of nuclear arsenals within the SALT II framework while observing the limitations of this treaty and insisting that the USSR take exactly the same steps;

To propose the unification of the talks on the limitation of medium-range and strategic weapons if the President should decide that this will promote a comprehensive agreement on arms limitation with the Soviet Union;

To immediately resubmit the 1974 treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear tests and 1976 treaty on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes to the Senate for discussion and agreement;

To conclude a verifiable treaty on a total nuclear test ban;

To actively promote the conclusion of a verifiable treaty on the prohibition of antisatellite weapons and space weapons;

To make every effort to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

To stop the production of the MX missile and B-1 bomber;

To prohibit the production of nerve gas and to promote the conclusion of a verifiable treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons and so forth.

When we examine these points of the Democratic program, we must remember that the promises bourgeois parties make in their campaign platforms are certainly not always kept by the new administration.

The need for constructive talks with the Soviet Union to stop the senseless arms race and to preserve peace on earth was passionately defended by Mondale himself when he addressed the convention delegates. "We know how deep the differences between us and the Soviet Union are," he said, "but the fact is that our two countries possess military arsenals capable of destroying the planet. Why has the present administration not acknowledged this simple fact? Why is it not trying to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union? Why is it deaf to the appeals of Americans and all sensible people to put these monstrous weapons under control? Why are we not having summit conferences with the Soviet Union at least once a year? Why are we unable to reach an agreement to save our planet? The fact is that we can and must do this."

The platform also promises to put an end to the "automatic militarization" of American foreign policy and stop the expansion and "Americanization" of armed conflicts in Central America. In his speech, Mondale also promised to stop the "illegal war in Nicaragua" within the first hundred days of his presidency, or, in other words, to stop the American support of the Somozist "Contras" who are waging a subversive terrorist struggle against the people of this country and its Sandinist government.

The program also says, however, that Democrats will continue relying on military force for the attainment of foreign policy goals, although "selectively" and "in accordance with the U.S. Constitution," and will not only continue but even increase the American military and economic support of Israel.

Many promises and appeals pertaining to domestic and social policy were also made in the party platform and in the speeches of the main convention delegates—W. Mondale, G. Ferraro, J. Jackson, G. Hart and Governor M. Cuomo of New York. They included the "fair distribution of the tax burden," the elimination of unemployment, the guarantee of equal opportunities in education and business for Americans of all races and nationalities, help for the disabled and the elderly and concern for the integrity and health of the American family.

The convention in San Francisco had widespread repercussions in the United States. Press organs supporting the Democrats tried to portray it as proof that the Democratic Party had finally regained its unity. Extensive coverage was given to the statements of G. Hart and J. Jackson that, in spite of the failure of their campaigns, they would forget all of their differences for the sake of the main goal of an election victory. "There is a time to compete and there is a time to cooperate." J. Jackson said, for example. "I will be proud to support our party's official candidate."

The opinion that the Democrats' chances in the coming election improved after the convention is being expressed more frequently. In THE NEW YORK TIMES, Democratic Party veteran J. Roe wrote: "The convention proved that the Roosevelt coalition of liberals, unions, blacks, urbanites, the unemployed, the poor and people living in similar conditions not only exists but is also being reinforced by other minorities, environmentalists, 'doves' and, above all, women who disagree with administration policy."

Another newspaper, NEWSDAY, commented on "two extremely clear and indicative" facts: "Jackson's participation in the race opened the door to politics for

members of ethnic minorities, and Mondale's choice of Ferraro as his runningmate was an acknowledgement of the role women will always play from now on in our country's politics."

The Republicans are preparing for a desperate campaign battle because they are fully aware that their administration has severely undermined the trust of the general public in the last 4 years. There has been a perceptible increase in demagogic statements from the White House, the head of which is using his position as a free campaign rostrum. Displaying absolute disregard for facts, Reagan and the Reaganists are extelling the Republican administration's domestic and foreign policy. They sound as though they have been staying up all night worrying about the needs and desires of the working public, about America's prestige in the world and about the prospects for peace on earth, and as though...they even made constant attempts to engage in constructive talks with the Soviet Union. In reality, however, Reagan and his "team" are still fueling chauvinistic, anti-Soviet and militarist feelings in the country.

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UNITED STATES, MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 84 (signed to press 22 Aug 84) pp 54-58

[Article by P. G. Litavrin]

[Text] The dangerous seat of tension the escalation of U.S. aggression has created in Central America has attracted so much attention that American-Mexican relations seem to have been obscured. These relations are too important to Washington, however, to take a secondary place among any U.S. administration's foreign policy priorities for long. Mexican President M. De la Madrid's trip to the United States in the middle of May highlighted complex problems and conflicts in American-Mexican relations.*

This visit coincided with the dramatic exacerbation of the situation in Central America, where the prospects for the political settlement advocated by Mexico were severely complicated by the intensification of U.S. military preparations and of aggressive actions against Nicaragua. As a member of the "Contadora Group,"** Mexico does not approve of the U.S. policy of brute force in Central America and believes that the Central American countries should reach a political and diplomatic mutual understanding on their own.

M. De la Madrid visited Washington at a time of economic difficulties for Mexico, which is experiencing a severe financial crisis. Its foreign debt, most of it owed to American banks, has reached 90 billion dollars, and the prospects for its repayment were complicated by the new rise in U.S. interest rates. This is creating additional difficulties for the Mexican economy.

Finally, the visit was important because it took place at the height of the American political campaign in which Ronald Reagan is trying to use any summit-level meeting for political advantages on the threshold of the presidential election. In this case, he made every effort to simulate an active search for political solutions in Central America.

^{*} For a more detailed discussion, see "The New Administration and the 'Mexican Factor,' SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1981, No 4--Editor's note.

^{**} For a discussion of the Contadora Group's proposals, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1984, No 6, p 26--Editor's note.

These are the reasons why both the American and the Mexican side tried to avoid any mention of the acute problems and conflicts abounding in American-Mexican relations during the talks. Nevertheless, as the press in both countries reported, conflicting approaches to the regional crisis and to the situation in Central America in particular could not be concealed.

It is no secret that Mexico and the United States view the events in the Caribbean in different ways. Whereas the Reagan Administration has made references to the "Cuban" and "Nicaraguan threat" to rationalize the unceremonious American intervention in regional affairs, the Mexican leadership justifiably feels that the main causes are poverty, underdevelopment and the severe internal conflicts which are rending the undemocratic regimes totally supported by the United States. When the president of Mexico spoke in Washington, he remarked: "We are convinced that the conflict in Central America is the result of economic weaknesses, political backwardness and social injustice in the countries of our region. For this reason, we cannot agree that reforms and structural changes pose a threat to other countries in our hemisphere."

During the visit both sides tried to underscore their interest in settling the conflict, regardless of its causes. But the problem was, the 21 May issue of NEWSWEEK remarked, that "there are also differing views on the methods of settling the conflict."

The Mexican view of the events in Central America, prominent Mexican political scientist A. Zinser noted in the anthology "The Future of Central America: Political Choices for the United States and Mexico," is that these events are not threatening the national security of the United States or Mexico. For this reason, "the countries of the region should be given a chance to develop in their own way."

This approach certainly does not mean that Mexico is indifferent to events in Central America. It is disturbed and troubled by the situation in the region. This is why it participated in drafting the proposals of the Contadora Group, put forth a number of initiatives and made an effort to organize American-Nicaraguan contacts. The first meeting of official representatives of Nicaragua and the United States--Deputy Foreign Minister V. Ugo Tinoco and special representative of the American President G. "Llaudeman--took place at the end of June in Mexico, in the peaceful resort town of Manzanillo.

There is a vast difference between the Mexican approach to the conflict and the position of the United States, which is intervening flagrantly in the internal affairs of sovereign states, ostensibly to defend its own security and the security of Mexico, and is seeking every possible pretext for the use of military force. For several years the Reagan Administration has been trying to convince the "naive Mexicans" that Mexico could also be "seized by the Reds" unless immediate steps are taken (of a military nature, of course). In February 1984, President Reagan signed PD-124, sanctioning economic and political pressure on Mexico to force it to support U.S. policy in Central America: the directive envisaged the cessation of American economic assistance. Before M. De la Madrid's visit, THE WASHINGTON POST reported, the White House temporarily refrained from economic pressure, but the directive prescribed "more

active diplomatic efforts to convince the Mexican Government to minimize its material and diplomatic support of communist partisans (in El Salvador) and its economic and diplomatic support of the Nicaraguan Government."

During M. De la Madrid's visit, the U.S. President repeated that "responsible governments in the Western Hemisphere" should not "take comfort in unrealistic optimism" and that "Mexico is underestimating the threat" posed by such countries as Cuba and Nicaragua. It is obvious that Washington wants Mexico to become party to the U.S. aggression in Central America or at least not to oppose it.

But this plan has not been supported by the Mexican leadership. It is disturbed by the aggressive U.S. behavior in the region. Mexico resolutely condemned the mining of Nicaraguan ports by CIA mercenaries, objected to the expansion of Somozist military operations against this country and does not approve of the continuous American-Honduran maneuvers or the buildup of the U.S. military presence in Central America and the Caribbean. During his visit, M. De la Madrid stressed quite unequivocally that Mexico rejects "any military plan whatsoever which might pose a serious threat to the security and development of our region."

The talks in Washington revealed, although not as distinctly, another difference in the positions of the two countries. This was Mexico's reluctance to regard the regional conflict as part of the overall East-West confrontation and its adherence to the policy of international detente.

After his trip to the United States, the president of Mexico joined five other heads of state and government in submitting a declaration of six countries (Argentina, Mexico, Greece, India, Tanzania and Sweden) to the United Nations, a declaration in which these countries advised that steps be taken to curb the race for nuclear and other weapons and reaffirmed their adherence to, and faith in, international detente and widespread mutual understanding with respect for the rights of each state to live in peace, security and independence and the right of all peoples to build their lives in accordance with their own wishes and aspirations.

This Mexican foreign policy line has long displeased the American leadership, which is irritated by Mexico's independent behavior in the international arena, primarily in its interrelations with developing and socialist countries.

As mentioned above, M. De la Madrid's visit to the United States took place under conditions which made it difficult for Mexico to defend its own position or to disagree with the United States. Its huge debt and economic problems were not discussed directly, but their invisible presence and their impact on the nature of the visit and on all American-Mexican talks were obvious.

The Reagan Administration's behavior indicates that it is concerned about Mexico's difficulties only because they might hurt the interests of American banks and corporations. For several years the United States has been promising to give Mexican goods broader access to the American market, to settle the problem of the Mexican immigrants and to organize economic and social cooperation in border zones. It has not, however, taken any significant steps in these directions.

In June the American Congress passed a special law to legalize the status of immigrants who entered the United States illegally after 1980. Around 6 million illegal immigrants now live in the United States, and half of them are Mexican. The passage of this law was widely publicized by the administration as a major concession to Mexico, which has always had an oversensitive reaction to the deportation of immigrants. In fact, the new law is primarily in the interests of American agricultural firms, which want cheap labor and, what is most important, laborers who have no rights. It does not provide immigrants with even minimal employment rights. The American press called it a "legalization of slavery."

Just before his trip to Washington, M. De la Madrid said that he hoped to "personally inform the President (of the United States--P. L.) of all our problems and ask him to facilitate the entry of Mexican goods into the United States, find a way of strengthening investments in Mexico and help Mexico attract more American tourists."

The only request Washington is likely to consider is the extension of more credit to Mexico, and even this will be done 1 traely for the purpose of preventing the collapse of the Mexican financial system, which is closely connected to the American one. Recently, Mexico received additional loans totaling 3.8 billion dollars from international banks with the assistance of the United States. The interest payments, however, are bleeding its economy dry. It is true that Washington's protectionist policy, which limits the access of goods from Mexico and other Latin American countries to the U.S. market, is rebounding against the United States: It is substantially limiting their ability to buy American goods; as a result, the Latin American countries reduced their imports from the United States by 32 billion dollars between 1981 and 1983, and this is equivalent to the loss of 600,000 jobs in the United States.

During the Mexican president's visit, Washington announced a new rise in interest rates. This meant that Mexico's foreign debt automatically increased by several billion dollars. It is quite understandable that the Mexican public regarded this as an unfriendly act, especially during a summit-level meeting. The head of the central Mexican labor organization, F. Velasquez, said that the higher interest rate would make economic conditions in Mexico even worse and the Mexican National Chamber of the Processing Industry stressed that this decision attested to the inconsistency of U.S. words and actions.

The Reagan Administration's behavior aroused anger in many Latin American countries precisely because it was inconsistent with Washington's earlier statements and assurances. The presidents of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico published a joint declaration demanding the reduction of interest rates.

When the Mexican president addressed the American Congress, he appealed for dialogue and mutual understanding between the industrially developed countries and the Latin American states. "Mexico and the countries of Latin America are striving to establish relations of a new type with the United States on the basis of equality and mutual respect. They want to rid themselves of all traces of subordination and to preserve their sovereignty and national

uniqueness," he said. But M. De la Madrid's appeals evoked no response or support.

Official U.S. spokesmen remained deaf to these appeals, just as they have remained deaf to the appeals of the Latin Americans and the progressive world public for constructive steps to normalize the situation in Central America.

The first consultative conference of the anti-imperialist organizations of Central America and the Caribbean, which was held in Havana at the end of June and was attended by representatives of over 30 parties and national liberation movements, was unanimous in its assessment of the explosive situation created in the region by the aggressive behavior of Washington and its proteges. After discussing the urgent need for peace in this region, conference speakers acknowledged that it is most important to display solidarity with socialist Cuba and revolutionary Nicaragua, as well as with patriots in El Salvador, Guatemala and other Central American countries. They asked all democratic forces in the region and the world to launch a campaign in defense of the people of Grenada, which has been occupied by the American military establishment, a campaign against all forms of U.S. military, economic and political aggression and a campaign for the dissolution of all U.S.-created military blocs in the region.

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ANNUAL ACDA REPORT REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 84 (signed to press 22 Aug 84) pp 105-107

[Review by V. I. Kuznetsov of book "Fiscal Year 1984 Arms Control Impact Statements," Wash., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983, XXV + 372 pages]

[Text] The Reagan Administration's attempts to achieve military superiority to the USSR are extremely destabilizing and pose a threat to peace. They are difficult to conceal even with the aid of the most clever arguments. This is reaffirmed by the examination of the annual report prepared for the U.S. Congress by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

One of the agency's main duties is to submit documents regularly to the Washington legislators to report on the correspondence of American military programs to the letter and spirit of treaties and of arms limitation and disarmament principles officially acknowledged by the U.S. Government. Once again, just as in the past, the agency had to perform the obviously impossible task of "whitewashing" the military preparations of an administration insisting on the deployment of the most dangerous weapon systems.

The first programs examined in the report are those pertaining to strategic weapons, including the land-based component of the U.S. strategic triad--ICBM's. Here the position of the agency is already quite apparent.

In October 1981 Reagan announced his administration's decision to deploy at least 100 MX missiles within the near future with a total potential of 1,000 highly accurate and powerful nuclear warheads, capable of destroying such well-fortified targets as ICEM silos and strategic command systems with almost 100-percent accuracy. The compilers of the report rationalize this dramatic buildup of first-strike potential simply with the harmless "need" to eradicate some kind of disparity resulting from U.S. "unilateral limitations" at a time when the Soviet Union, they say, "deployed a new generation" of strategic systems (p 12). It is true that they also admit that the USSR will interpret the deployment of the MX as a U.S. attempt to gain strategic advantages. But this is applauded in the report, because this will supposedly create "additional incentives" for the USSR to engage in "serious" arms limitation talks with the United States. This "line of reasoning" proves that the agency is willing to defend any military preparations.

The agency's position on the projected basing method of the MX missile is quite indicative. From the very beginning, the Reagan Administration has been categorically against the ratification of the SALT II treaty. It is true that it did later announce its decision to observe the provisions of the treaty on the condition that the Soviet Union do the same (the treaty prohibits the construction of additional permanent launchers for land-based strategic missiles). One of the alternative methods in the administration's plans was the dense-pack basing method, which would require the construction of new silos. The agency gave it its blessing. It "discerned" a "new concept" of deployment in this method and it therefore does not foresee any violations of SALT (p 16).

The report then goes on to examine the second, maritime element of the strategic triad. Here the central program concerns the construction of a new generation of missile-carrying Tridents. According to the report, 7 of these ships will be built by the end of 1987 and a total of 13 will be built within the near future (p 40).

The administration has great hopes—and this is confirmed in the report—for a strategic submarine fleet equipped with Trident-2 missiles, which will, on the one hand, considerably expand their patrol zone and, on the other, heighten their ability to destroy hardened targets. Just as in the case of the MX, these missiles are also described merely as an "incentive" for the Soviet Union to begin "sensible" talks with the United States for the conclusion of arms control and reduction agreements (p 67).

The agency has not overlooked programs pertaining to the airborne component of strategic forces. The report applauds the deployment of the new generation of strategic bombers capable of "successfully surmounting the Soviet air defense system even in the 1990's" (p 75). Of the 100 B-18 bombers planned by the administration, 15 should be on combat duty by October 1986, and the rest should be ready by June 1988 (pp 75-76).

Strategic cruise missiles are expected to increase the "penetrating ability" of strategic aviation considerably. According to the current plans of the U.S. Defense Department, the report says, over 3,000 of these will be deployed (p 72). Again, the agency tries to justify this substantial buildup of strategic potential with air-based cruise missiles, which are highly accurate and almost invulnerable nuclear systems, with the desire to "restore" (no strategic balance with the USSR (p 97).

It is true that the authors of the report admit that the deployment of cruise missiles will create difficulties in the sphere of control. Obviously, this will undermine future arms limitation and reduction agreements, but the agency feels that the refusal to deploy these extremely destabilizing weapon systems would be unwise from the standpoint of "national security" considerations (p 100). These "considerations" are revealed quite clearly when the authors admit that the airborne component of the strategic triad possesses capabilities unattainable by other components: the capability of seeking out mobile and highly undetectable targets and "subjecting them to risk" (p 10).

The agency also devotes a large section of its report to strategic defense programs. According to the administration's plans, ABM systems and space defense systems should constitute the basis of these programs.

Space defense systems began to be discussed widely in the United States a relatively short time ago--at the end of the 1970's. The development of these systems is being accompanied by allegations that the USSR has been highly active in this field. The report also mentions some kind of "existing" system of this type in the Soviet Union (p 121).

In 1978 and 1979 Soviet-American talks were held for the purpose of reaching an agreement on the curtailment of the arms race connected with space defense systems, but the American delegation soon broke off the talks. The agency justifies the American side's move with references to "national security" considerations. But if the United States were really lagging behind in this sphere of such great importance to it, as the report says several times, it would have been highly illogical to break off talks serving the goals of stronger security.

Of course, the United States had another reason. Space is precisely the sphere in which the United States intends to achieve the superiority it wants and thereby acquire a chance to exert political pressure on the USSR. It is no coincidence that there are "deletions" in this part of the report (the full text of the document is available, as we know, only to the Congress), and these deletions are present not only where the properties of space defense systems are described, but also where the goals of their projected deployment are listed (p 121).

One of the standard arguments used to validate the development of ABM systems in the United States, despite the restrictions listed in the 1972 ABM treaty, is the allegation that the Soviet Union undertook the serious improvement of the qualitative features of its ICBM's in recent years, and that this has radically undermined the ability of American "deterrence" forces to take countermeasures. The agency also takes this position and supports the intensive development in this sphere. Furthermore, the report even says that broad-scale R & D in the ABM sphere will only make the treaty more "viable" and create "favorable conditions" for future strategic arms limitation talks (p 13.).

Arguments further from the truth would be hard to invent. After all, as even American authorities have repeatedly admitted, the Reagan Administration's present ABM programs will undermine the 1972 agreements. They could step up the arms race in the defensive and offensive respects.

The section on medium-range nuclear weapons is also intriguing. It focuses on questions connected with the deployment of land-based cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles in Europe. In particular, it says that 560 cruise missiles are to be delivered for this purpose: 464 to be put on alert and 96 to be used for testing, training and replacement. Of course, the agency asserts that the cruise missiles are capable of having only a "stabilizing effect" (p 177). As for the Pershing II missiles, according to the agency there will

be "too few" in Europe (108) and they will be unable to fully secure the possibility of a "first strike" against the USSR. In general, the authors' views on deployment are fully "in line" with the position of the Reagan Administration. According to them, the USSR will be "motivated" to engage in "meaningful" arms control talks only when the prospect of the deployment of American nuclear weapons like the Pershings and cruise missiles becomes a reality (p 178).

The sections in which programs for sea-based cruise missiles, "battlefield" nuclear systems, chemical weapons and laser weapons are analyzed reveal the same attitudes.

Let us summarize our findings. The agency's reports have always suffered from logical defects and they have always contained a multitude of ambiguous statements, juggled facts and rationalizations, but in the report for fiscal year 1984 these are all present in an unprecedented variety. After all, the agency is essentially giving its blessing to any move the administration makes—even the most reckless—and is giving military preparations a propaganda screen.

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BOOK VIEWS REAGAN POLICY ON RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 84 (signed to press 22 Aug 84) p 111

[Review by I. N. Kravchenko of book "'Sily bystrogo razvertyvaniya' vo vneshney politike SShA" [The "Rapid Deployment Force" in U.S. Foreign Policy], by V. M. Men'shikov and P. V. Pen'shikov, Moscow, Mezhdnuarodnyye otnosheniya, 1984, 107 pages]

[Text] Ronald Reagan's 4 years in the White House have been marked by a number of actions to further U.S. imperialism's hegemonic ambitions. The creation of a special mobile unit for the Pentagon, the so-called "rapid deployment force" (RDF), is prominent among these actions. With the aid of extensive documented information, the authors of the book describe the workings of this police unit patrolling vast regions of the Near and Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa, etc. (p 11).

The deployment of the RDF in key spots in the Pacific, in the Near and Middle East and on the African or Latin American continents is mainly intended to counteract the national liberation movements, which the White House can no longer ignore (p 80). The authors take a detailed look at the structure and workings of the RDF, its deployment patterns, maneuvers and actions in the deserts of North Africa, oil-producing regions in the Middle East and other hot spots in the world.

According to the authors, the interventionist RDF, trained and equipped with the latest means of warfare, including nuclear weapons, represents "an army in search of a war," or, as the American PROGRESSIVE magazine recently put it, "in search of a battlefield for the display of its capabilities."

Directing attention to the active U.S. efforts to create a "second-echelon" RDF--the NATO combined rapid deployment force (the RDF is now independent of the North Atlantic bloc)--V. M. Men'shikov and P. V. Men'shikov trace the White House's efforts to globalize NATO's role. They describe Washington's search for means of exerting pressure on each of its partners within the framework of the notorious "Atlantic solidarity" for the purpose of forcing them to support the Reagan Administration's aggressive policy (p 37).

Vehement opposition to this belligerent policy is growing in the United States, and not only within the antimilitarist movement or pacifist organizations, but

also among prominent members of the bourgeoisie with far from liberal views. The authors quote an indicative statement from THE NEW YORK TIMES: "President Reagan has replaced foreign policy with senseless militarism and saber-rattling from El Salvador to Saudi Arabia, and this is sending chills up and down the spines of our friends, from Japan to West Germany" (p 95).

The efforts of the USSR and other socialist states to expose the adventuristic U.S. plans connected with the use of the RDF are discussed in detail in the book.

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BOOK VIEWS U.S. ATTEMPT TO BLOCK GAS PIPELINE PROJECT

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 84 (signed to press 22 Aug 84) p 112

[Review by B. P. Sitnikov of book "Kontrakt veka (o gazoprovode Zapadnaya Sibir'--Zapadnaya Yevropa)" [The Contract of the Century (On the Pipeline from West Siberia to Western Europe)] by I. S. Bagramyan and A. F. Shakay, Moscow, Politizdat, 1984, 94 pages]

[Text] Ceremonies marking the completion of the transcontinental gas pipeline from West Siberia to Western Europe were held on 13 January 1984 in Ober-Geilbach, a town located at the juncture of Alsace and Lotaringia. The completion of this pipeline signified the total failure of the White House's unprecedented attempts to wreck the "deal of the century" and discredit the idea of productive East-West cooperation.

In this book, which is written in a journalistic style, the authors discuss the economic and social aspects of this unique international agreement and thoroughly examine all of the forms and methods of Washington's "antigas warfare," subjecting all of the American propaganda "conclusions" and "arguments" to a discerning analysis and describing the resulting acute conflicts between the United States and its NATO allies.

Attempts to weaken the economies of the socialist states, especially the Soviet Union, and to undermine trade contacts with the Western countries, the authors note, lay at the basis of Washington's foreign political and economic strategy for the 1980's. "The United States, realizing the dangerous implications of head-on confrontation with our country and the Warsaw Pact states, is trying to destroy socialism on the economic front by exhausting it, on the one hand, with an arms race and, on the other, by depriving the socialist economies of the advantages of international division of labor.... The White House chose the 'gas for pipes' transaction as the chief target of this war" (pp 51-52).

The scenarios of the antigas campaign were composed in the United States, and all of the main roles were written. Members of the highest echelons of government--President R. Reagan, former Secretary of State A. Haig, Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger and some senators and congressmen--took an active part in the attack on the transcontinental pipeline. According to Republican

Senator J. Garn, the subversion of the project would not only deprive the Soviet Union of an important source of hard currency but would also force our country to reduce shipments of crude energy resources to socialist states—that is, weaken the process of integration in the CEMA countries and make them dependent on fuel imported from the capitalist world (p 53).

The book is of definite interest as a study of the American strategy and tactics of "all-out" economic warfare against the USSR and other socialist countries.

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BOOK VIEWS U.S. ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN ASIAN PACIFIC

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 84 (signed to press 22 Aug 84) pp 112-113

[Review by M. I. Zakhmatov of book "Ekonomicheskiye interesy SShA v aziatskotikhookeanskom regione" [U.S. Economic Interests in the Asian Pacific] by A. B. Parkanskiy, Moscow, Nauka, 1983, 208 pages]

[Text] The United States has recently intensified its efforts to escalate the arms race and to increase friction in the Pacific basin. In connection with this, the new book by A. B. Parkanskiy is quite timely. It contains an analysis of the latest trends in U.S. foreign economic ties with developed and developing countries in the Asian Pacific region, a detailed description of long-range tendencies in their socioeconomic development and an exposure of the real essence of U.S. economic policy.

The author correctly notes that by the beginning of the 1980's U.S. foreign economic ties had already become an important part of the reproduction process. This is graphically demonstrated by a comparison of exports and imports to physical production. The proportion accounted for by exports in U.S. physical production rose from 14 percent in 1970 to 29 percent in 1980, and the figure for imports rose from 14 to 34 percent during the same period—that is, the indicators reached their highest point of this century.*

These processes are particularly noticeable in the American Pacific coast states, where the development of the main sectors of the economy—the aerospace, electrical equipment and radioelectronic industries, instrument building and some branches of the extractive, timber and food industries, agriculture and the service sphere—are indissolubly connected with foreign markets and foreign sources of crude resources and materials.

The importance of Pacific expansion to the United States is constantly growing. In the 1960's U.S. activity in the economies of the Asian Pacific region was much less intense than the efforts to broaden economic ties with the West European states, especially the EEC countries. At the beginning of the 1980's, however, the developed capitalist and developing countries and territories of

^{*} INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS, Wash., June 1983, pp 36-37.

the Pacific region turned into one of the regions with the highest growth rates of American private capital investments. Direct investments by U.S. corporations in the Asian Pacific countries in 1980 were almost five times as great as in 1967 and totaled around 22.3 billion dollars, while the total value of American private direct investments abroad increased 3.6-fold during this decade (p 55). In 1980 the region accounted for almost one-fourth of all American foreign trade and, in terms of cost, U.S. trade volume with the countries of this region rose to almost 180 billion dollars (p 80). Since 1972 U.S. trade volume with these countries has exceeded American corporate exchange with the EEC states. Furthermore, whereas the former exceeded the latter by just over 300 million dollars in 1972, the difference had increased to 15.7 billion dollars by 1979 (ibid.).

The author cites data to prove that trade and commercial technology exchange with the countries and territories of this region and the export of capital to them are developing much more quickly than U.S. foreign economic ties in general.

The book contains an original analysis of the effect of foreign economic ties on the economic development of the American West Coast. The author states that the American Pacific west (the states of California, Washington, Oregon, Alaska and Hawaii) is among the most industrially developed parts of the country along with the northeastern and southeastern states. Export production and industries depending on imported crude resources and minerals are concentrated in the west. It is interesting that the foreign trade of these five states accounted for almost 20 percent of all U.S. foreign commodity exchange in the early 1980's and is increasing more quickly than U.S. foreign commercial exchange in general (pp 7-37).

The author arrives at the justifiable conclusion that the growth of U.S. economic interests in the Pacific conflicts with the comparatively weaker U.S. influence there. This is due to the broader influence of socialist ideas and the heightened anti-imperialist tendencies in the policy of Pacific developing states and to the severe exacerbation of conflicts with Japan and other imperialist rivals in the markets of this region.

One of the most important features of the U.S. efforts to retain influence in the Asian Pacific is the emphasis on regionalism. The author thoroughly examines U.S. undertakings in Southeast Asia and Oceania.

A. B. Parkanskiy's book contains the first detailed analysis of theories of the Pacific community in Soviet literature. As we know, the U.S. desire to create an exclusive group of developed capitalist and developing countries in the region became quite evident when Ronald Reagan visited Japan and South Korea in November 1983.

In an attempt to subordinate the developing countries and territories to the needs of their economies, the United States, Japan and other developed capitalist states are making a more vigorous effort to attach them to the capitalist economic system within the framework of a group which will be supranational in nature and will introduce and protect practices benefiting transnational corporations.

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BOOK ON U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 84 (signed to press 22 Aug 84) pp 113-114

[Review by B. I. Gvozdarev of book "Kuba v mezhamerikanskikh otnosheniyakh" [Cuba in Inter-American Relations] by V. Kh. Vladimirov, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1984, 302 pages]

[Text] This book analyzes the effect of the Cuban revolution on the development of the international situation in the Western Hemisphere and the struggle of the Latin American people against the expansionist aims of U.S. imperialism and for an independent foreign policy line in their own national interests.

The Cuban patriots' liberation wars of the last third of the 19th century were the prelude, as Cuban leaders have repeatedly stressed, to the glorious Cuban revolution, "which not only overthrew a bourgeois-oligarchic regime in one of the Latin American countries but also struck a blow at the imperialist interests of the United States on the continent" (p 70). The victory of the Cuban revolution proved that even in Latin America, which had been regarded as imperialism's home front, forces resolutely advocating the eradication of exploitative regimes and the creation of a new society in the interests of the workers could triumph.

The crisis in U.S. relations with Latin American countries is specifically reflected in the bankruptcy of the doctrines and theories designed to "justify" U.S. hegemony on the continent: Pan-Americanism, the theory of ideological boundaries, the concept of the "peaceful regulated revolution" and others. The Latin American countries are trying to break out of the Procrustean Bed of the inter-American system to united action in the international arena and global political and economic relations. The crisis became even more severe after such unlawful actions by the imperialist powers as the U.S. aggression against Grenada, the "undeclared war" the Pentagon and CIA are fighting against Nicaragua and Washington's continuous and massive anti-Cuban campaigns.

Movements for the preservation of natural resources and the stricter observance of the fundamental principles of international law, recorded in the UN Charter, are gaining strength in the Latin American countries.

The increased participation of Latin American countries in the nonaligned movement, which has become an influential force in world politics, is a vivid

illustration of the gradual liberation of these countries from U.S. "wardship" (p 233). Many Latin American countries have begun to view the nonaligned movement as an important element of their foreign policy, broadening the range of their activities in the international arena. In turn, the participation of the countries of this region in this movement has expanded its geographic framework and enriched it with the Latin American experience in struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism. The Republic of Cuba, one of the established leaders of the movement, invariably supports the just demands of Latin American countries with regard to the protection of national interests and opposes the attempts of Washington and its agents to split the nonaligned movement and undermine its anti-imperialist aims.

V. Kh. Vladimirov also discusses such important aspects of the crisis of the inter-American system as the changing views of the majority of Latin American countries in the OAU on the "Cuban question," the cancellation of the anti-Cuban sanctions Washington imposed on this organization in 1964 and the normalization of relations with revolutionary Cuba by many states of the region.

V. Kh. Vladimirov thoroughly criticizes the anti-Cuban policy line of U.S. ruling circles, which became even more aggressive after the start of the Reagan Administration (p 262). The author correctly concludes that "Cuba, which has courageously repulsed all of Washington's intrigues for 25 years, is prepared to continue repulsing any and all anti-Cuban actions."

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SEMEYKO REVIEWS 'THREAT TO PEACE' BOOKLET

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 84 (signed to press 22 Aug 84) pp 114-117

[Review by L. S. Semeyko of book "Otkuda iskhodit ugroza miru" [Where the Threat to Peace Comes From], 3d edition, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1984, 96 pages]

[Text] Principled but objective judgments, informative and simultaneously analytical material—this is a brief description of the third edition of "Otkuda iskhodit ugroza miru," published this July. The first edition (1982), followed by a second, supplemented edition published the same year, immediately aroused the interest of the Soviet and world public.

The third edition, which retains the format of the previous editions and many of their important conclusions, reflects the new international events of the last 2 years, the present state of the American military machine and the military strategy of the United States and NATO. The new subsections on the verification of treaties and agreements and on the prevention of the militarization of space are of great value. The sections on general-purpose forces and chemical weapons have been expanded. The politically pertinent question of the actual causes of the disruption of nuclear arms talks and the substance of Soviet responses are revealed, and new facts and figures—and quite a few of them—are cited for a more complete evaluation of the present military and political situation in the world. All of this means that the information in the third edition is not only pertinent but also quite current.

The main features of present-day U.S. military strategy, a strategy of aggression, and its material base—the armed forces—are discussed in detail in the book. The Pentagon's declared strategy of "direct confrontation" between the United States and the USSR is supposed to ensure that the United States will "prevail" in a nuclear war and will "be able to force the USSR to quickly cease all hostilities on U.S. terms" (p 64). An essential condition for this is military superiority to the USSR in all respects—in strategic offensive weapons, in space and in conventional weapons—and the willingness to start various types of aggressive wars—nuclear and conventional, general and "limited," relatively quick and protracted. Putting special emphasis on preparations for "limited" nuclear wars with the aim of guarding U.S. territory against a retaliatory nuclear strike, the engineers of American military strategy have not placed any restrictions on "geographic" escalation. The armed forces are to be prepared for general warfare against the USSR and its

allies simultaneously in several military theaters. These fundamental premises of American military strategy are revealed in the book with references to the latest official U.S. documents and statements by U.S. military and political leaders.

The balance of East-West military forces is discussed at length. Conclusive evidence is presented to prove that the military-strategic balance is an objective fact. For example, even according to American official data, the USSR and United States have approximately equal quantities of warheads on land- and sea-based ballistic missiles--7,500 each. The USSR has more warheads on ICBM's but the United States has 2.5 times as many on SLBM's (around 6,000). The United States has 4 times as many strategic bombers and, consequently, many more nuclear munitions on them (pp 9, 70). Whereas the USSR has more strategic carriers, the United States is ahead in the number of nuclear charges on them. The approximate balance of strategic nuclear power is self-evident. This refutes the American thesis about the need to "restore" this balance by deploying new weapons--the MX, Midgetman and Trident missiles, long-range cruise missiles and the B-1B and Stealth bombers. The actual purpose of these strategic programs was unequivocally defined by C. Weinberger: "We (the United States) will spend whatever it takes to increase American strength and gain an advantage over the Soviet Union" (p 71).

There is also an approximate balance in medium-range weapons in Europe. The deployment of the improved SS-20 missiles did not change it because SS-4 and SS-5 missiles were simultaneously withdrawn (in a ratio of 3:2). Before the SS-20's were deployed, the USSR had 600 missiles in the West, but now it has only 473, and around half of these are old. The total force of all the charges was reduced by almost half during this time (p 472). But they do not say anything about this in the West, just as they do not say that NATO has around 1.5 times as many warheads on missiles and medium-range planes (ibid.).

The United States and its allies would like to disrupt the balance of medium-range weapons by deploying 572 new American missiles in Europe. An important fact is pointed out in the book: Each launcher can be used several times. It is no coincidence that the projected missile reserve in Western Europe (around 900 Pershing II's and 100 cruise missiles) far exceeds the number of launchers scheduled for deployment (p 20). This fact is also being hushed up in the West, where they are talking about only 572 missiles.

The Soviet responses to the deployment of the "Euromissiles" are described in the book. The unilateral moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in the European half of the country, especially SS-20 missiles, was canceled. Lenger-range operational and tactical missiles are being deployed in the GDR and Czechoslovakia with the consent of their governments. Soviet submarines with nuclear missiles have been sent closer to the continental United States, and their number has been increased. All of this has been done to create the appropriate reciprocal threat to the territory of the United States and the West European states where the "Euromissiles" are being deployed. The fact that these measures were not planned in advance is underscored in the book (pp 73, 76). They were compulsory and they will be canceled if the United States removes its missiles from Europe.

The American attempts to achieve military superiority are analyzed in detail in the book. The creation of the comprehensive strategic (offensive plus defensive) potential for a first, pre-emptive strike occupies a central position among these attempts. The capabilities of strategic offensive forces are to be augmented at least 1.5-fold, with emphasis on the deployment of new, highly accurate weapon systems (p 36). There has been a particularly dramatic reversal in the direction of the militarization of space. The development and deployment of antisatellite weapons within the near future and ABM systems in the more distant future certainly do not have a defensive purpose. "For the United States, the creation of antisatellite forces would be meaningless if it were not planning to deliver a first strike and start a nuclear war"--this statement, quoted in the book, by the author of numerous studies of U.S. military space programs, Karas, candidly reveals the real purpose of the "star wars" program (p 38). The real purpose is to secure the ability to deliver the first nuclear strike against the USSR with impunity. But these efforts are futile. "In this case, Washington has forgotten the simple fact that the party against whom these decisions are made will certainly not sit back and wait for these events to occur. This party will do everything possible to frustrate the potential aggressor's adventurist plans. And there is no question that they will be frustrated" (p 40). Reagan's "defense plan" is paving the way for a fundamentally new and extremely dangerous round of the strategic arms race, which would have an extremely negative effect on the prospects for arms limitation and reduction, would make the future USSR-U.S. strategic balance unpredictable and, what is most important, would dramatically increase the danger of nuclear war. At a specific stage of the arms race, the creation of an "absolutely reliable shield" and "inescapable sword" could give the United States the illusion of superiority, and this could motivate it to push the nuclear button.

The stepped-up development of American general-purpose forces is given serious attention in the book--theater nuclear weapons, ground troops, tactical aviation and the navy. The main emphasis in the plans for the augmentation of their strength has now been placed on offensive capabilities in war with and without the use of nuclear weapons. The "Assault Breaker" search-and-destroy system is being developed, and a fundamentally new weapon system, a searchand-destroy complex designed for deep offensive actions is being tested in the Air Force. These and other measures to heighten the fire and striking power of conventional forces are completely in line with the new "Airland Battle" concept adopted by the United States in August 1982 (and by NATO in December of that year). This concept, the book says, presupposes surprise attacks with the use of all of the latest means of armed struggle at great operational depths in order to deliver the maximum strike against enemy troops, gain an overwhelming advantage and launch a resolute offensive to seize enemy territory (p 68). It is clear that this is a concept of an exceptionally aggressive and offensive nature. Its logical connection to first-strike plans is obvious, and this certainly disturbs those who have given serious thought to the real reasons for the heightened danger of war.

The conclusive arguments presented in the book and the reinforcement of statements with facts and figures, including the latest statistics, again lead to an unambiguous conclusion: The American threat to peace is growing. There is a firghtening chain in evidence here: the emphasis on pre-emption in military doctrine, the creation of the appropriate nuclear potential and the

preparations for the sudden use of nuclear, conventional and chemical weapons. The emphasis on victory in nuclear and conventional wars, regardless of their scales and duration, lies at the basis of the present U.S. military doctrine. Its chief element—nuclear strategy—is essentially a return to the original U.S. strategy of "massive retaliation" (p 14), which kept the world on the brink of war in the 1950's.

Now the threat to peace is growing not only as a result of the use of the latest technical achievements in the U.S. military machine, but also as a result of the Washington leadership's heightened willingness to use this machine.

What direction will international affairs take in the future—the direction of stronger peace and less danger of war or the direction of the arms race and a greater danger of war? This question, the book says, is now of primary importance. The USSR is convinced that East—West relations can and must be redirected into the channel of detente, which was consistent with the desires and aims of the majority of people in the world. The USSR has proposed a group of constructive solutions to key problems in international affairs, designed to reduce and even eliminate the threat hanging over mankind. These solutions, including the new Soviet proposals, are summarized in the book, and this is another of its good points.

The book contains logical criticism of the American approach to the major problems of curbing the arms race and strengthening international security. This is a "double-bottomed" approach. The widely publicized "peaceful" statements of the American leadership are in striking contrast to its actions: the rejection of the idea of no first use of nuclear weapons, the refusal to conclude an agreement on the non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations, the resistance of the idea of a nuclear freeze, the continuous buildup of "Eurostrategic" potential, the blocking of agreements on the prohibition of chemical weapons, etc. And the reason is clear. "People in Washington want to view the world 'from a position of American strength,'" the book justifiably concludes (p 95).

The USSR has always fought a resolute struggle against this policy of its chief opponent in the world arena. Any attempts to disrupt the balance of power will be futile. Attempts to safeguard one's own security at the expense of others are also futile in the nuclear age. The USSR's policy of equal security for all, the guarantee of general security, friendly relations and detente is not a momentary whim. This is a permanent policy. It is time for the leaders in Washington to realize that frightening people with the myth of the "Soviet military threat" has ceased to be effective. "People in the Soviet Union would like to believe that U.S. and NATO policymakers will be able to take a more objective and unbiased look at things and ultimately take a realistic stance for the purpose of eliminating the real threat to peace, and not some kind of imaginary military threat" (p 96). This concluding statement in an extremely pertinent and valuable book reaffirms the fact that the USSR still hopes for the fundamental improvement of Soviet-American relations and East-West relations.

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LEGISLATIVE VETO OVERTURN SEEN STRENGTHENING PRESIDENT VS. CONGRESS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 84 (signed to press 22 Aug 84) pp 120-127

[Article by A. A. Mishin: "Legal Relations Between the President and the Congress"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] People in the United States are still debating a Supreme Court decision of June 1983 on a case directly related to a fairly common matter in American jurisprudence--the deportation of a foreign citizen who remained in the country after his visa had expired. This decision, however, had immediate and acute political repercussions and aroused the interest of the public, the media, the administration and the Congress. The reason was that the Supreme Court decision said that the so-called legislative veto was unconstitutional and thereby essentially repealed provisions in almost 200 laws envisaging the possible use of this veto power. The heated debates in political and legal circles were less the result of the wholesale nullification of an impressive number of laws than of the political implications of the repeal of the legislative veto in the President's relations with the Congress. The influential American weekly U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT expressed this opinion: "The crushing Supreme Court decision, which restricts the authority of legislators, gave rise to a fierce struggle between the Congress and the White House, which should rage on for many years."1

We should recall that the U.S. Constitution originally granted the veto (Latin for "I forbid") power only to the President; Section 7 of Article 1 of the constitution empowers him not to sign a bill submitted to him and to return it to the Congress "with his objections." Only a qualified majority (two-thirds) vote in each of the two congressional chambers can override the presidential veto. The presidential veto is unique because he can reject only the entire bill, and not individual portions of it. In contrast to the present, the governor of a state has "item" veto power—that is, he can veto individual items of a bill from the state legislature.

The President of the United States also has so-called "pocket veto" power. The President exercises this right when he deliberately avoids signing a bill within the 10 days specified in the constitution just at the time when the Congress will adjourn before the end of this period. In this case, the bill is considered to be rejected: Congress cannot override the "pocket veto" because no procedure is envisaged for these cases.

What is the purpose of the legislative veto and why would its repeal, according to American observers, have a perceptible effect on the functioning of the U.S. machinery of government in the future?

CONSTITUTIONAL ROOTS, PURPOSE AND HISTORY OF THE LEGISLATIVE VETO. The organization of the U.S. machinery of government is based on the principle of the separation of powers, presupposing the independence of the three branches of government--legislative, executive and judiciary, represented by the Congress, the President and the Supreme Court. To secure the stability of government institutions and the continuous functioning of the government, the founders of the U.S. Constitution adopted in 1787 envisaged a system of "checks and balances" to keep any one branch of government from usurping power. example, the Congress was empowered to reject executive bills, refuse to approve federal appointments and impeach the President. The President, in turn, was granted the delaying veto power, which Congress can only override if the rejected bill is repassed by a qualified majority of the members of both houses. The Supreme Court was actually invested with the right of judicial review (although the constitution does not say anything about this), which allows it to limit the legislative activity of the Congress and the regulating activity of the President.

For two centuries the system of checks and balances was constantly adapted to changing economic, social and political conditions. Numerous innovations were validated with references to the constitution, which is so terse and vague that it allows for arbitrary interpretation.

The legislative veto (the congressional prohibition of the regulating acts of the President, federal departments and agencies) was the logical product of the development of the system of checks and balances. With the aid of the veto, the Congress could control the exercise of the regulating powers of the executive branch, which it delegated to this branch.

The legislative veto first made its appearance and became the object of clashes between the legislative and executive branches of government in 1920. At that time, President W. Wilson vetoed a bill giving the joint congressional committee on the press the right to control publications of the executive branch containing information about its activity. But the real history of the legislative veto began 12 years later.

In 1932 an appropriations bill empowering the President to reorganize the executive branch was passed by the Congress. The bill contained the statement that any presidential order issued for the exercise of powers delegated to the President by this law could be declared invalid by any congressional chamber within 60 days. In December 1932 Republican President H. Hoover (he was soon to be succeeded by Democratic President-Elect F. D. Roosevelt) submitted a series of executive proposals to the House of Representatives, where the Democrats held the majority. The House Committee on Government Operations examined these proposals and recommended their rejection on the grounds that Hoover's proposed reorganization could be carried out with greater success by the new chief executive. On 19 January 1933 the House vetoed these proposals. Since that time, the legislative veto has been a major means of the congressional oversight of executive affairs.

The legislative veto means that a regulating act or decision of the President, an executive department or a federal agency is prohibited by the Congress as a whole or one of its chambers (or a standing committee). This means, consequently, that Congress can control the exercise of delegated powers by executive bodies. The right of the legislative veto with a specified deadline for its use and the subjects empowered to exercise the right were stipulated in each specific case in a congressional act.

For example, the 1973 resolution on war powers, having the force of law, stipulated that if the President should commit U.S. armed forces to action in any other country in the absence of a declaration of war or a special legal order, the Congress can, by a concurrent resolution (that is, a resolution of both houses), require the President to recall the armed forces without delay. The 1974 act on congressional budget control stipulated that any time the President asked the Congress to approve a delay in budget appropriations, his request could be denied by a resolution of any chamber. According to the 1982 law on Department of Defense appropriations, any change in specific appropriations for military purchases in excess of stipulated limits could be vetoed by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.

Stipulations of this kind, pertaining to methods of using the legislative veto, are present in almost 200 congressional acts. The judicial procedure of the legislative veto usually took the form of concurrent or simple resolutions. In contrast to bills or joint resolutions, which are passed by both houses and go into effect only after they have been signed by the President within the 10 days specified in the constitution (and can be rejected by him), concurrent and simple resolutions are passed either by both houses or one and do not require the President's signature. This means that the President cannot veto them in the way that he vetoes bills and joint resolutions. Finally, bills and joint resolutions become laws after they have received presidential approval, whereas concurrent and simple resolutions are not regulative because they do not stipulate general rules of behavior but refer only to specific cases.

Therefore, the legislative veto has a special force and impact. It is absolute because it cannot be rejected by the executive branch. The presidential veto, however, is in the nature of a postponement because it can be overriden by the repassage of the bill or by a joint resolution supported by two-thirds of the vote in each house.

The legislative veto was engendered by the delegation of regulating powers to executive bodies by the Congress. For this reason, the frequency of the passage of acts envisaging the legislative veto increased as Congress delegated more regulating powers. Between 1932 and 1939, for example, 5 laws envisaging the legislative veto were passed; 19 such laws were passed between 1940 and 1949; 34 between 1950 and 1959; 49 between 1960 and 1969; 89 within the next 5 years (1970-1975); over 30 during just the first two and a half years of Ronald Reagan's presidency. 3

Laws envisaging the legislative veto were not only passed but were also enforced, and quite effectively. By using the veto power, the legislative branch rejected 14 of President Truman's 47 reorganization plans, 3 of

Eisenhower's 17 plans, 4 of Kennedy's 10 plans and 1 of Johnson's 17 plans. The Congress rejected an extensive federal reorganization plan proposed by R. Nixon,

Gradually the legislative veto turned into a fairly powerful weapon in the hands of the legislators and began to annoy the executive branch. The administration was particularly irritated by the use of the legislative veto in the sphere of U.S. foreign policy activity—that is, in a sphere traditionally regarded as the exclusive realm of the President and foreign policy agencies. The legislative veto of presidential actions connected with U.S. policy abroad made its appearance in the early 1970's. For example, the resolution on war powers, giving Congress the power to veto presidential decisions on the commitment of armed forces to action abroad, was passed in 1973, in an atmosphere of acute confrontations between President R. Nixon and the Congress.

In 1976 the Congress secured itself the right to veto the sale of military equipment and heavy artillery and the offer of military services to foreign states. "Since military transactions exceed 10 billion dollars a year," Senator E. Kennedy said, "they can have a direct effect on the balance of power in certain parts of the world.... The legislative veto would therefore be completely appropriate for the prevention of the misuse of power, incompatible with the original bases of the constitutional system of checks and balances."

The extensive use of the legislative veto by the Congress in the 1970's was a reaction to the federal administration's scandalous abuses of power. These included the dirty war against Vietnam, the bombing of Cambodia, the Watergate swindle, the participation of the CIA in the coup d'etat in Chile, the illegal shipments of weapons to reactionary regimes and the many violations of the constitutional rights of citizens by intelligence agencies. The more frequent use of the legislative veto was also due to the fact that the American public was disturbed by the broader regulating activity of administrative agencies making up an important part of the federal government.

POLITICAL ARGUMENTS OF SUPPORTERS AND OPPONENTS OF LEGISLATIVE VETO. It must be said that the legislative veto fits into the system of checks and balances as they have been developed in American political practices. The Congress resorted to its use to control the regulating powers it delegated to the executive branch, and not all aspects of administration activity. The Congress gave executive bodies essentially legislative powers with one hand while attempting to put them under its own control with the other. This situation gave Chief Justice W. Burger of the Supreme Court reason to say that the legislative veto had become a "touching compromise" between the two branches of government because it was "one way of adapting the requirements of contemporary American public administration to the traditional role of legislator and watchdog." 5

The "touching compromise" actually concealed a struggle between the President and the Congress, which reflected not only the institutional interests of the two branches of government but also the absolutely tangible interests of the segments of the ruling elite behind them. In this struggle, the President and the Congress used the weapons at their disposal: The former used the

constitutional veto or the threat of its use, while the latter used the legislative veto or its fiscal powers.

During the 50-year dispute over the expediency of the legislative veto, its supporters and opponents actually used the same arguments. Both made references to the constitutional principle of the separation of powers and insisted on the effective exercise of powers by the Congress and the federal administration.

The supporters of the legislative veto made references to abuses of regulating powers by federal agencies and demanded the reinstatement of the Congress as the only constitutional legislative body. In 1979, for example, a law was passed on Federal Trade Commission (FTC) appropriations, with one of its amendments envisaging a unicameral veto. According to this amendment, each congressional house had the right to protest any FTC decision affecting all industry within 60 days. Senator H. Schmitt presented interesting arguments in favor of this amendment: "The authors of the constitution did not have our discomfort in mind when they composed this document. They wanted accountability and the separation of powers. They wanted elected representatives to sign the laws of our nation. The FTC's present powers to write and enforce laws, called rules, is an encroachment upon our traditional belief that only elected officials should write laws. The legislative veto is a reasonable legislative solution to this problem. The delegation of legislative powers to the FTC can continue, but the Congress must have the right to control these powers and prevent their abuse."

The supporters of the legislative veto also said that its use against presidential foreign policy decisions would restore the constitutional powers the White House had usurped in the sphere of foreign policy. Commenting on the 1973 resolution on war powers, Senator E. Kennedy said: "The provision on the legislative veto was intended to restore the constitutional responsibility of the Congress to 'declare war' and to 'raise and support armies.'"

Conservative critics of the legislative veto believe that it weakens presidential authority, makes it less flexible and efficient, allows liberal legislators to interfere in foreign policy, which has traditionally been regarded as the President's domain, restricts the constitutional duty of the President to see to the proper execution of laws and reduces the overall effectiveness of the exercise of domestic and foreign policy powers by the executive branch. 8

Liberal critics of the legislative veto believe that it serves the interests of business because it gives the Congress a chance to reject executive decisions having at least some restraining effect on business interests.

According to many American attorneys and politicians, the dubious constitutionality of the legislative veto and the negative attitude of conservatives and liberals toward this veto have made many people wonder why it has existed for so long in spite of this and why it is being used more and more widely.

It was inevitable that the constant political friction between the executive and legislative branches would necessitate intervention by the third branch, the judiciary, to settle the matter of the constitutionality of the legislative

veto and the "legitimacy" of its place in the system of checks and balances. For a long time the judiciary refused to settle the problem, citing the doctrine of the "political issue," in accordance with which the court does not examine constitutional disputes of a political nature. The severity of this problem, its importance in the functioning of government and the logic of the development of American public administration, however, motivated the Supreme Court to hear a case in which the constitutionality of the legislative veto was questioned.

THE SUPREME COURT ON THE LEGISLATIVE VETO. The Supreme Court decision that the legislative veto was unconstitutional, adopted by a majority of the votes (seven against two) and announced on 23 June 1983, concerned the specific case of the deportation of a man named J. R. Chadha and five other people.

The facts of the case were the following. J. R. Chadha, a foreign citizen, entered the United States in 1966 on a student visa. On 30 June 1972 his visa expired. In October 1973 the Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service decided to deport Chadha; he protested this decision and took the matter to the courts. After numerous delays, in June 1974 the immigration appeals judge ruled that Chadha could not be deported because there were no conclusive arguments in favor of deportation. In line with the requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, the judge who stopped the deportation reported his decision to the Congress. The U.S. attorney general (minister of justice) reviewed the original decision of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and recommended to the Congress that Chadha's deportation be stopped. For a year and a half the court order to stop the deportation of Chadha and over 300 other foreigners remained in force because the Congress did not discuss the matter.

According to \$244 (c) (2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, each congressional house has the power to pass a resolution invalidating the decision of an administrative body with regard to the deportation of a foreigner if this decision is connected with the execution of powers delegated by the Congress to the attorney general in the sphere of laws on immigration, naturalization and nationality.

In December 1975 the House of Representatives passed a resolution excluding Chadha and five other foreigners from the deportation stop order recommended by the attorney general. In this way, the House overturned the decision of an executive agency by resorting to the unicameral legislative veto.

After lengthy bureaucratic procedures, the immigration appeals judge ruled that Chadha and the five others would be deported in accordance with the House resolution. Chadha appealed the deportation order all the way up to the U.S. Supreme Court on the grounds that \$244 (c) (2) of the 1952 act was unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court's arguments about the unconstitutionality of the legislative veto were essentially the following. The constitution, proceeding from the principle of the separation of powers, clearly defines the functions of the Congress and the executive branch in the legislative process. The provisions

of Article I of the constitution, regulating this process, are an integral part of the constitutional separation of powers. The legislative veto, in accordance with the constitution, could be regarded as a legislative act, and the corresponding procedures specified in the constitution should then extend to it. The adoption of a legislative act is a power exercised jointly by both congressional houses and the President.

The principle of bicameralism, lying at the basis of the legislative process, presupposes that all legislative acts-bills and joint resolutions--must be approved by the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Supreme Court particularly stressed: "An examination of the action taken by one chamber in accordance with §244 (c) (2) of the 1952 act indicates that it was essentially legislative in its purpose and implications. Consequently, this action, called the legislative veto, was taken in violation of Article 1 of the constitution."

Another principle of the legislative process which the Supreme Court considers to have been violated by the legislative veto is the principle of presidential approval of the draft legislative act. Section 7 of Article 1 of the constitution specifies that each bill approved by the House of Representatives and the Senate must be sent to the President and will become law only after he has signed it. This principle was also violated because the House decision on the deportation was not sent to the President.

Therefore, according to the Supreme Court, the decision to deport Chadha and the others could be made in only one way—with the approval of both houses and the subsequent submission of the decision to the President for his approval. The Supreme Court stressed that the constitution clearly defines the categories of unicameral actions not requiring presidential approval.

Supreme Court Justice L. Powell supported the final conclusion of the majority of court members on the unconstitutionality of the legislative veto, but cited other arguments in favor of this choice. He believes, in particular, that the Congress usurped judicial functions in the Chadha case and thereby violated the principle of the separation of powers. Powell stressed that the House of Representatives was essentially performing the functions of a judicial body when it investigated the case on the deportation of an individual. The unconstitutionality of this action is particularly obvious in view of the fact that the Congress, in contrast to judicial or administrative bodies investigating disputes in the manner established by law, is not bound by legal standards or procedural rules.

In contrast to the majority of members of the court, L. Powell regards the legislative veto of administrative decisions on deportation as a judicial action, and not a legislative one. Nevertheless, he also concluded that the use of the legislative veto by a congressional chamber contradicts the principle of the separation of powers because one branch of government takes on the functions assigned by the constitution to another branch.

The Supreme Court decision, compiled by Chief Justice Burger on behalf of the majority of court members, as well as the opinion of L. Powell, contains numerous references to the protocols of the Constitutional Convention, the

works of the "founding fathers" of the American Republic, legal precedents and the works of American legal experts. The entire line of reasoning was intended to prove the unconstitutionality of the legislative veto. By declaring that it was contrary to the constitution, the court actually repealed all of the provisions envisaging the legislative veto in almost 200 different laws. A severe blow was dealt to the Congress' powers at the same time that the already quite free discretion of the President and administrative agencies in the exercise of powers delegated to them was perceptible augmented.

A fuller assessment of the prospects for the development of the system of checks and balances in the American machinery for the separation of powers, however, necessitates a brief look at the arguments Supreme Court Justice B. White presented to support the constitutionality of the legislative veto in his dissenting opinion.

CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF LEGISLATIVE VETO. B. White regards the legislative veto as a reasonable and useful means of maintaining a balance in the separation of powers, a means totally consistent with constitutional principles. He stated: "The significance of the legislative veto in our contemporary political system and its importance to the Congress could hardly be overestimated. It has become the main instrument with which the Congress secures the accountability of bodies of the executive branch and independent administrative agencies."

White recalled that the legislative veto became part of political practice at the time of F. D. Roosevelt's presidency, when the need for effective government intervention in economic affairs for the purpose of surmounting the economic crisis led to the expansion of government. Without the legislative veto, the exercise of the broad powers delegated to the executive branch and independent agencies would have escaped congressional control entirely. President Roosevelt regarded the legislative veto as unavoidable payment for his "exceptional power" to regulate the crisis-ridden economy.

Proceeding from the belief that the principle of the separation of powers presupposes not only the division of functions but also the effective interaction of branches of government (through the system of checks and balances) for the attainment of common government goals, White stressed that the legislative veto is an important and, possibly, even irreplaceable political invention. It allows the President and the Congress to reconcile major constitutional and political differences of opinion, secure the accountability of independent administrative agencies and maintain congressional control over the administration's regulating activity.

In recent years the legislative veto has counterbalanced the delegation of broad powers to the executive branch in new spheres of government activity—space programs, international agreements on nuclear energy, tariff agreements, etc. It has become a means of reaching compromises in conflicts between the President and the Congress over such important constitutional issues as the expenditure of funds, the use of armed forces and the declaration of states of emergency. The legislative veto thereby corresponds completely to the role the Congress should play, according to the constitution, in the system for the separation of powers.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice White consistently supports the idea that the legislative veto is actually the only means of controlling the vast quantity of extremely complex delegated regulating powers of executive departments and administrative agencies, covering a much broader range than the regulating activity of the Congress itself. The legislative veto, White says, is not a legislative measure, but a means of congressional control over the regulating activity of the executive branch, performed on the instructions of the Congress. Furthermore, White quite logically notes that as soon as the functioning of the institutions of the contemporary government requires extensive powers, which are essentially legislative or "quasilegislative" by virtue of their broad range, the Congress has the right to control the exercise of the powers it has delegated with the aid of such means as the legislative veto.

Actually, the Supreme Court officially recognized the unconstitutionality of only the unicameral veto. "The court's analysis of Article 1 of the constitution," White wrote, "quite probably divests all forms of the legislative veto of their legal force, regardless of their procedures and objects." This view is not shared by all, but, judging by articles in the American press, it is the prevailing view. This is why White feels that the Supreme Court decision is regrettable, because the court "imprudently" called provisions of almost 200 laws unconstitutional in the investigation of a case concerning the specific matter of the deportation of certain individuals.

PROSPECTS FOR THE REPLACEMENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE VETO WITH OTHER FORMS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE ADMINISTRATION. At first, we might think that this Supreme Court decision would lead to perceptible changes in the relations between the President and the Congress in the system of checks and balances in favor of the executive branch. In any case, the Capitol's pointedly negative reaction to the decision could be a strong argument in support of this conclusion. But there are also other points of view. For example, when political science Professor N. Ornstein addressed a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on 20 July 1983, he said: "It is quite obvious that the Supreme Court decision will engender more problems for the executive branch in the performance of its functions and much more work for the Congress." We must not forget that the executive branch cannot work without executing the regulating powers delegated by the Congress. In turn, the Congress must oversee this activity in one way or another.

It is still too early to draw any final conclusions about all of the possible effects of the Supreme Court decision on the U.S. machinery of government. It is possible, however, that Congress will take measures to compensate for the loss of the legislative veto.

Immediately after the announcement of the Supreme Court decision, Congress began discussing new forms of control over the regulating activity of the executive branch without the legislative veto. The following main alternatives are now being considered: 11

1. The repeal of all laws containing provisions on the legislative veto, and the passage of new laws regulating the execution of powers delegated to the executive branch.

- 2. The passage of laws stipulating that any regulating act by an administrative agency must be approved by a joint resolution of both houses of Congress, which will then be signed by the President (this proposal has already been included in a House-approved bill on the Consumer Products Safety Commission).
- 3. The introduction of the "report and wait" procedure, in accordance with which a regulating act of an administrative agency will be submitted to the Congress, where it will remain for a specific period of time; it will go into effect only after it has been approved by the Congress and the President within this time period.
- 4. The addition of provisions to bills on appropriations for the purpose of preventing the expenditure of funds for the execution of regulating acts not approved by the Congress.

Some legislators have also proposed legislation depriving the federal courts of jurisdiction in matters connected with the legislative veto, or a constitutional amendment overturning the Supreme Court decision.

The choice of one of these alternatives and their possible impact will depend on various factors in U.S. domestic politics. We can definitely say, however, that the nullification of the legislative veto--that is, the loss of one of the Congress' important powers--is completely in line with the general and constant tendency toward a stronger executive branch in the American system of checks and balances. The Supreme Court decision merely reflected this process, which has always been characteristic of the American bourgeois government.

FOOTNOTES

- 1. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 4 July 1983, p 14.
- 2. "Statement of E. Schmults, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Concerning Legislative Veto, on July 18, 1983," Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice.
- "Compilation of Currently Effective Statutes that Contain Legislative Veto Provisions," U.S. Department of Justice, 15 July 1983.
- 4. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 6 February 1980, p S1082.
- 5. THE ECONOMIST, 2-8 July 1983, p 21.
- 6. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 1 February 1980, p S801.
- 7. Ibid., 6 February 1980, p S1081.
- 8. V. A. Savel'yev, "The Legislative Veto," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1979, No 3.

- 9. Excerpts from the Supreme Court decision on the Chadha case are taken from the official text of the decision— Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha et al, S. Ct. No 80-1832 (1983).
- 10. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, 23 July 1983, p 1501.
- 11. Ibid.

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